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Can Wanting to Believe Make Us Believers?
Daniel Garber discusses the issue with Gary Gutting at The Stone.
Smith's Argument Against the Compatibility of Naturalism and Concept Correction
In this post, I'd like to look at Smith's argument that Dretske/Tye/Lycan-style naturalistic accounts of concept acquisition can't account for the possibility of correcting faulty concepts.
As with the other arguments we've discussed from the book, Smith doesn't explicitly lay out his argument in standard form. But I think it can be expressed fairly as follows:
1. If the views of Dretske et al. are correct, then the act of introspection requires that the representation of its referent comes to us pre-packaged with a conceptualization.
As with the other arguments we've discussed from the book, Smith doesn't explicitly lay out his argument in standard form. But I think it can be expressed fairly as follows:
1. If the views of Dretske et al. are correct, then the act of introspection requires that the representation of its referent comes to us pre-packaged with a conceptualization.
2. If the act of
introspection requires that the representation of its referent comes to us
pre-packaged with a conceptualization, then we cannot introspect our
experiences in a non-conceptual way.
3. If we cannot
introspect our experiences in a non-conceptual way, then we cannot compare what
is non-conceptually represented in experiences with a concept.
4. If we cannot
compare what is non-conceptually represented in experiences with a concept,
then we cannot correct concepts.
----------------------------------
5. Therefore, if
the views of Dretske et al. are correct, then we cannot correct concepts.
The argument is clearly valid. Furthermore, (1) seems to be true in virtue of the views of the authors referred to in the premise, and (2) and (3) are at least prima facie plausible, if not something in the neighborhood of analytic truths. But why does Smith think we should accept (4)? From our discussion in the previous post, we see that (4) expresses Smith's view that the only way
to correct mistaken concepts is via comparing the concept to its referent via non-conceptual awareness of the latter to see if they "match". But why think that? It seems to me that there are at least three reasons to doubt (4).
First, it doesn't take too much trouble to think up epistemically possible ways to correct our concepts even if our introspected experiences come pre-packaged with them. Off the top of my head, here are three: (i) Those who regularly produce and retain concepts that are wrong about things are likely to die quickly (e.g., "That creature running toward me is friendly"; "These (poisonous) berries are nutritious", etc.), and are thereby naturally selected out of the gene pool. By contrast, those with more accurate concepts are more likely to survive and reproduce. (The argument is supposed to be independent of Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism, so let's leave it aside for another day.); (ii) less drastically, faulty concepts can be corrected or replaced by inference through rudimentary hypothesis-testing. Concepts that are inept or inferior with respect to helping us navigate our way through the world are revised or replaced; (iii) faulty concepts can be corrected through communication with others and testimony. Perhaps there are some fundamental problems with each of these proposals, but unfortunately Smith doesn't tell us what they are.
Second, whatever one thinks of these epistemic possibilities, Smith's argument should immediately make one think something must be wrong with premise 4. For if we can’t correct concepts that can't be directly compared to their referent to see if they "match", then truth-conducive theoretical reasoning, including scientific theorizing, is impossible, and I don't think even Smith wants to grant that.
Finally, it's not clear how Smith can accept (4) without accepting a logically inconsistent set of propositions. This is because he later wants to argue that we can have indirect, inferential knowledge of God through inductive and deductive reasoning. Given that clearing the decks to make room for the the latter claim is the primary aim of the book, it would seem that Smith is committed to rejecting (4).
That's it for now. Next time, we'll look at Smith's argument against the compatibility of naturalism and concept formation.
First, it doesn't take too much trouble to think up epistemically possible ways to correct our concepts even if our introspected experiences come pre-packaged with them. Off the top of my head, here are three: (i) Those who regularly produce and retain concepts that are wrong about things are likely to die quickly (e.g., "That creature running toward me is friendly"; "These (poisonous) berries are nutritious", etc.), and are thereby naturally selected out of the gene pool. By contrast, those with more accurate concepts are more likely to survive and reproduce. (The argument is supposed to be independent of Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism, so let's leave it aside for another day.); (ii) less drastically, faulty concepts can be corrected or replaced by inference through rudimentary hypothesis-testing. Concepts that are inept or inferior with respect to helping us navigate our way through the world are revised or replaced; (iii) faulty concepts can be corrected through communication with others and testimony. Perhaps there are some fundamental problems with each of these proposals, but unfortunately Smith doesn't tell us what they are.
Second, whatever one thinks of these epistemic possibilities, Smith's argument should immediately make one think something must be wrong with premise 4. For if we can’t correct concepts that can't be directly compared to their referent to see if they "match", then truth-conducive theoretical reasoning, including scientific theorizing, is impossible, and I don't think even Smith wants to grant that.
Finally, it's not clear how Smith can accept (4) without accepting a logically inconsistent set of propositions. This is because he later wants to argue that we can have indirect, inferential knowledge of God through inductive and deductive reasoning. Given that clearing the decks to make room for the the latter claim is the primary aim of the book, it would seem that Smith is committed to rejecting (4).
That's it for now. Next time, we'll look at Smith's argument against the compatibility of naturalism and concept formation.
Smith's Master Argument Against Naturalistic Accounts of Perceptual Knowledge in Naturalism and Our Knowledge of Reality
Last time we discussed Smith's book, we focused on his master argument against naturalistic accounts of concept acquisition and correction. Here I'd like to focus on his master argument against naturalistic accounts of perception. As with the former argument, Smith nowhere explicitly lays out the argument in standard form. However, I think it can be fairly expressed as follows:
1. If naturalism is true, then either naturalistic direct realism (think Armstrong, Dretske et. al.) is true or some version of indirect realism is true.
2. If some version of indirect realism is true, then we don’t have adequate internally accessible grounds for believing that our perceptual experiences are caused by and accurately represent the external world.
3. If we don’t have adequate internally accessible grounds for believing that our perceptual experiences are caused by and accurately represent the external world, then we don’t have perceptual knowledge of the external world.
4. Therefore, if some version of indirect realism is true, then we don’t have perceptual knowledge of the external world.
5. If naturalistic direct realism is true, then a causal chain stands between the external world and our perceptual beliefs.
6. If a causal chain stands between the external world and our perceptual beliefs, then we don't have internally accessible grounds for believing that our perceptual beliefs are caused by and accurately represent the external world.
7. If we don't have internally accessible grounds for believing that our perceptual beliefs are caused by and accurately represent the external world, then we don’t have perceptual knowledge of the external world.
8. Therefore, if naturalistic direct realism is true, then we don't have perceptual knowledge of the external world.
9. Therefore, if naturalism is true, then we don’t have perceptual knowledge of the external world.
The argument is clearly valid. However, it's also clear that one can raise a number of worries about its premises and their justification. Here though, I'd like to raise three worries for the argument. First, perhaps the most obvious worry is that the argument relies on the truth of internalism with respect to knowledge (See premises 3 and 7). It would thus be helpful if Smith engaged with the recent literature on the internalism/externalism divide, and provided an argument for epistemic internalism in his book. Unfortunately, one will look in vain to find such.
Second, it seems that Smith is operating with a very narrow notion of internally accessible grounds, viz., (i) immediate, direct acquaintance with the referent (for basic beliefs), and (ii) an argument from (i)-type grounds (for non-basic, inferential beliefs). But this is to ignore an account of internally accessible grounds from one of the dominant versions of epistemic internalism today, viz., phenomenal conservatism. According to the latter sort of account, perceptual seemings constitute a basic source of evidence or justification for beliefs, even if these seemings don't involve immediate, direct acquaintance with their referents. So, for example, it seems to me that I'm in my office. In at least this sense, then, I have non-inferential, internally accessible evidence that I'm in my office. Why isn't this sufficient internally accessible (defeasible) evidence for the perceptual belief at issue? Again, one will look for an answer to this reply (and, more generally, for engagement with the literature on phenomenal conservativism) in vain if one looks for it within the pages of Smith's book.
Finally, Smith doesn't adequately develop his grounds for thinking that perceptual knowledge is impossible even on the conjunction of indirect realism and his narrow conception of epistemic internalism. This is troubling, given semi-recent arguments that begin with Smith's starting points and reach the opposite conclusion. See, for example. the case for an abductivist route to internalist accounts of knowledge and justification for perceptual beliefs from Bonjour, Vogel et. al.
In short, Smith fails to show that naturalists who are (i) externalists about both knowledge and justification, (ii) externalists about knowledge but internalists about justification, or even (iii) internalists about both knowledge and justification -- i.e., virtually everyone -- can't have perceptual knowledge or justified perceptual beliefs. For at least these reasons, then, Smith's master argument against naturalistic accounts of perceptual knowledge is unsuccessful.
The Argument from Tragic Moral Dilemmas
Here's another argument I'm toying with. It's a variation on the problem of evil. The basic line of thought is that there are tragic moral dilemmas in our world, i.e., contexts in which a moral agent must make a choice, but all available choices will ruin a good person -- they must choose something that is a moral abomination. The paradigm case of this sort of tragic moral dilemma is the central case in the movie, Sophie's Choice. Recall that in this case, the mother must choose which of her two children to hand over to be killed by the Nazis. If she refuses to choose, both children will die. (We can add that if she offers herself in their place, the Nazi soldier will kill all of them). The argument can be stated simply as follows:
1. If theism is true, then there are no tragic moral dilemmas.
2. It's not the case that there are no tragic moral dilemmas.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Therefore, theism is false.
Premise 2 seems true. What about premise 1? Perhaps the theist could construct a theodicy or defense to undercut the premise, but what could it be? It seems that free will defenses and soul-making theodicies fall flat in such cases. What, then?
In any case, that's the basic argument. Thoughts?
The Argument from Environmental Mismatch
Here's another argument I'm toying with. The Earth is filled with harmful and lethal flora and fauna. Furthermore, such flora and fauna are often either undetectable, or look harmless upon first inspection. Theism makes this surprising, as the Earth is supposed to be our home, and not a Hunger Games scenario. By contrast, such a human-inhospitable environment is expected on the conjunction of naturalism and evolution. So if theism is true, then there appears to be a root mismatch between goal and outcome. Such an argument is conceptually distinct from arguments from evil; it's a planning or implementation problem at root, and not a moral problem.
In any case, that's the basic idea. Thoughts?
Getting Clear on One of Smith's Core Argument in Part I of Naturalism and Our Knowledge of Reality
(Rough Draft)
In this post, I'd like to try to get clear on the master argument of Smith's critique of naturalistic accounts of concept acquisition in Part I of Naturalism and Our Knowledge of Reality.
Smith's master argument in Part I relies on his own picture of concept acquisition, correction, and application, so it's crucial to get clear on the latter first. Unfortunately, Smith's account is never explicitly laid out, relying on several illustrative examples in lieu of such. His account is thus frustratingly under-explicated. But we can extract from Smith's examples a programmatic sketch of his account of concept acquisition and application in terms of the following five phases, adding labels to each one for ease of reference:
1. All of Phases 1-5 (of Smith's account) are required for genuine concept acquisition, correction, and application as we find them in humans
2. Naturalistic accounts don't have the materials to account for all of Phases 1-5.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Therefore, naturalistic accounts can't explain genuine concept acquisition, correction, and application as we find them in humans.
So that's the master argument against naturalistic concept acquisition. Why should we accept the premises? Smith's grounds for 2 consist in a critique of what he takes to be a representative sampling of the most promising naturalistic accounts of knowledge on offer.
What about premise 1: Why should we accept it? That is, why think all five of Smith's phases are required for genuine concept formation, correction, and application? Smith doesn't say much about Phases 2 and 3, but I find them relatively plausible. Furthermore, we've already seen Smith's rationale for Phase 1 in our discussion of ch. 1., viz. that without direct awareness of the external referents of perception, one falls prey to radical skepticism about perceptual knowledge, as one can never be sure that one's internal representations of them are caused by them and accurately represent them.[1]
In this post, I'd like to try to get clear on the master argument of Smith's critique of naturalistic accounts of concept acquisition in Part I of Naturalism and Our Knowledge of Reality.
Smith's master argument in Part I relies on his own picture of concept acquisition, correction, and application, so it's crucial to get clear on the latter first. Unfortunately, Smith's account is never explicitly laid out, relying on several illustrative examples in lieu of such. His account is thus frustratingly under-explicated. But we can extract from Smith's examples a programmatic sketch of his account of concept acquisition and application in terms of the following five phases, adding labels to each one for ease of reference:
Phase 1: Acquaintance: One becomes directly aware of the entity (for knowledge of an individual), or of a sufficiently large quantity of particular tokens of a type of entity (for knowledge of kinds of entity), in an unvarnished, pre-conceptual mode of presentation.
Phase 2: Feature-Noticing and Labeling: One notices the features of the entity (or a series of entities, for knowledge of kinds of entity) and labels (i.e., associates a term with) them.
Phase 3: Object/Kind Recognition and Abstraction: One begins to recognize which features of the entity (or kind of entity) are individuative of it (or them) -- at least at a level sufficient for practical purposes.
So that's Smith's account of concept formation, acquisition, and correction. With his account in mind, we can express his master argument in Part I simply, as follows:Phase 4: Comparison and Correction: When needed, one compares the object (or tokens of the type of object) with the concept to determine if the concept needs correction. In at least some cases (esp. borderline cases/"close calls"), this process relies upon (i) a capacity to compare object to concept to determine whether they "match", which in turn relies upon (ii) the capacity for introspective awareness of one's concept and (iii) the capacity for non-conceptual awareness of one's current experience and non-conceptual recall of one's past experiences. This process is, in at least some cases, (iv) a conscious, intentional process, not sub-personal and automatic.Phase 5: Competent Application: One is able to regularly and successfully apply the concept to the entity (or tokens of that type of entity). In at least some cases (esp. borderline cases/"close calls"), this process relies upon(i) a capacity to compare object to concept to determine whether they "match", which in turn relies upon (ii) the capacity for introspective awareness of one's concept and (iii) the capacity for non-conceptual awareness of one's current experience and non-conceptual recall of one's past experiences. This process is, in at least some cases, (iv) a conscious, intentional process, not sub-personal and automatic.
1. All of Phases 1-5 (of Smith's account) are required for genuine concept acquisition, correction, and application as we find them in humans
2. Naturalistic accounts don't have the materials to account for all of Phases 1-5.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Therefore, naturalistic accounts can't explain genuine concept acquisition, correction, and application as we find them in humans.
So that's the master argument against naturalistic concept acquisition. Why should we accept the premises? Smith's grounds for 2 consist in a critique of what he takes to be a representative sampling of the most promising naturalistic accounts of knowledge on offer.
What about premise 1: Why should we accept it? That is, why think all five of Smith's phases are required for genuine concept formation, correction, and application? Smith doesn't say much about Phases 2 and 3, but I find them relatively plausible. Furthermore, we've already seen Smith's rationale for Phase 1 in our discussion of ch. 1., viz. that without direct awareness of the external referents of perception, one falls prey to radical skepticism about perceptual knowledge, as one can never be sure that one's internal representations of them are caused by them and accurately represent them.[1]
What about Phases 4 and 5? Recall that Smith thinks both phases require three capacities:
(i) a capacity to compare object to concept to determine whether they "match".
which in turn relies upon
(ii) the capacity for introspective awareness of one's concept.
and
(iii) the capacity for non-conceptual awareness of one's current experiences and non-conceptual recall of one's past experiences.
Finally, Smith thinks that
(iv) this process is, in at least some cases, a conscious, intentional process, not sub-personal and automatic.
I'm inclined to agree with Smith that (iv) is prima facie plausible. But why are we supposed to think (i)-(iii) are required? We'll go into these in some detail in a future post, but for now I want to note that Smith's core rationale is that otherwise we can't be sure if our concepts are accurate. Thus, the same assumption is at the heart of Smith's objections to naturalistic accounts of both percepts and concepts: knowledge of external referents is impossible if an intermediary stands between mind and world -- sense data in the case of perceptions of the world, and concepts in the case of conceptualizations of the world. In short, Smith's core assumption is that naked, unmediated access to the world and our experience of it are required for knowledge.
Our reconstruction of Smith's master argument in Part I reveals three core issues to explore in evaluating it: one for premise 1 and two for premise 2:
Re: premise 1: (a) Are all five of Smith's phases of concept acquisition required? In particular, does concept acquisition regarding the external world require unmediated, unconceptualized access to both it and our introspective states?
Re: premise 2: (b) Are the naturalistic accounts of knowledge Smith criticizes representative? (c) If they are representative, are his criticisms successful?
That's it for now. Next time, I'll explore question (a).
Our reconstruction of Smith's master argument in Part I reveals three core issues to explore in evaluating it: one for premise 1 and two for premise 2:
Re: premise 1: (a) Are all five of Smith's phases of concept acquisition required? In particular, does concept acquisition regarding the external world require unmediated, unconceptualized access to both it and our introspective states?
Re: premise 2: (b) Are the naturalistic accounts of knowledge Smith criticizes representative? (c) If they are representative, are his criticisms successful?
That's it for now. Next time, I'll explore question (a).
----------------------------------------------------
[1] We discussed the merits (or lack thereof) of Smith's response to the epistemic externalist's reply on this score in the post on ch. 1.
CfP Announcement: Explaining and Explaining Away in Science and Religion
CFP: Explaining and Explaining Away in Science and Religion
Submission deadline: November 7, 2014
Conference date(s):
January 8, 2015 - January 9, 2015
Conference Venue:
University of Ulster
Belfast, United Kingdom
Topic areas
Details
EXPLAINING AND EXPLAINING AWAY IN SCIENCE AND RELIGION
Belfast, 8-9 January, 2015
Overview
In discussions about the relationship between science and religion, it is sometimes argued that scientific explanations remove or undermine the need for religious explanations. Although such explanations might be logically compatible, the claim is that there is no need for two explanations when one will do. Given Occam's razor and the success of science, it is claimed that religious explanations are no longer needed for features of the world around us. Is this correct? Has science 'explained away' the need for religion? This conference will address this issue by exploring topics such as:
• what are the similarities and differences between scientific and religious explanations?
• can science explain away religious beliefs?
• can religious explanations complement scientific explanations?
• case studies from the history of science and religion on the above themes
The conference will be of interest to philosophers, scientists, theologians and historians of science. Keynote speakers include:
Revd. Dr. Rodney Holder (Cambridge)
Prof. David N. Livingstone (QUB)
Prof. Roger Trigg (Oxford)
Call for Papers
Contributed papers are invited on the topics identified above (or related topics relevant to the conference theme). An extended abstract of no more than 1000 words should be submitted to Dr Shuwei Chen (s.chen@ulster.ac.uk) by Friday 7 November and decisions will be made by 21 November. We will be approaching a publisher about the possibility of publishing a volume based on papers presented at the conference.
Funding is available to support travel and accommodation expenses for speakers.
This conference is part of a two year project on 'Explaining and Explaining Away' at the University of Ulster which is funded by the John Templeton Foundation. Details of the project can be found at:
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Alimi's New Paper on the Problem of Divine Domination
Alimi, Toni. Divine domination . Religious Studies (2025), 1–19. doi:10.1017/S0034412525100917 Abstract: This article develops the problem ...