Mawson's New Book on God and the Meaning(s) of LIfe
Mawson, T.J. , God and the Meanings of Life: What God Could and Couldn't Do to Make Our Lives More Meaningful. Bloomsbury, 2016.
Benton's New Paper on Religious Diversity and the Epistemology of Disagreement
Benton, Matthew. "Religious Diversity and Disagreement", In N. J. L. L. Pedersen, M. Fricker, P. Graham & D. Henderson (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Social Epistemology. Routledge (forthcoming).
Here's the abstract:
Epistemologists have shown increased interest in the epistemic significance of disagreement, and in particular, in whether there is a rational requirement concerning belief revision in the face of peer disagreement. This article examines some of the general issues discussed by epistemologists, and then considers how they may or may not apply to the case of religious disagreement, both within religious traditions and between religious (and non-religious) views. |
Andrew Moon's New Paper on Recent Work in Reformed Epistemology...
...in the latest issue of Philosophy Compass. Here's the abstract:
UPDATE: Thanks!
Reformed epistemology, roughly, is the thesis that religious belief can be rational without argument. After providing some background, I present Plantinga's defense of reformed epistemology and its influence on religious debunking arguments. I then discuss three objections to Plantinga's arguments that arise from the following topics: skeptical theism, cognitive science of religion, and basicality. I then show how reformed epistemology has recently been undergirded by a number of epistemological theories, including phenomenal conservatism and virtue epistemology. I end by noting that a good objection to reformed epistemology must criticize either a substantive epistemological theory or the application of that theory to religious belief; I also show that the famous Great Pumpkin Objection is an example of the former.And if a copy should make its way to my inbox...
UPDATE: Thanks!
Klaas Kraay's New Survey Aricles on God and Gratuitous Evil...
...in the latest issue of Philosophy Compass: "God and Gratuitous Evil (Part I)" and "God and Gratuitous Evil (Part II)". Here's the abstract:
And if copies should find their way to my inbox, I wouldn't mind it in the least.
UPDATE: Thanks!
In contemporary analytic philosophy, the problem of evil refers to a family of arguments that attempt to show, by appeal to evil, that God does not (or probably does not) exist. Some very important arguments in this family focus on gratuitous evil. Most participants in the relevant discussions, including theists and atheists, agree that God is able to prevent all gratuitous evil and that God would do so. On this view, of course, the occurrence of even a single instance of gratuitous evil falsifies theism. The most common response to such arguments attempts to cast doubt on the claim that gratuitous evil really occurs. The focus of these two survey papers will be a different response—one that has received less attention in the literature. This response attempts to show that God and gratuitous evil are compatible. If it succeeds, then the occurrence of gratuitous evil does not, after all, count against theism. After introducing some key terms, I survey the literature surrounding the attempts by Michael Peterson and John Hick to execute this strategy. In a follow-up paper, I discuss the attempts of William Hasker, Peter van Inwagen, and Michael Almeida, respectively.
And if copies should find their way to my inbox, I wouldn't mind it in the least.
UPDATE: Thanks!
New Paper on Skeptical Theism and the Parent Analogy
Rutledge, John Curtis. "The Parent Analogy: A Reassessment", International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (forthcoming). Here's the abstract:
According to the parent analogy, as a caretaker’s goodness, ability and intelligence increase, the likelihood that the caretaker will make arrangements for the attainment of future goods that are unnoticed or underappreciated by their dependents also increases. Consequently, if this analogy accurately represents our relationship to God, then we should expect to find many instances of inscrutable evil in the world. This argument in support of skeptical theism has recently been criticized by Dougherty. I argue that Dougherty’s argument is incomplete, for there are two plausible ways of construing the parent analogy’s conclusion. I supplement Dougherty’s case by offering a new argument against the parent analogy based on failed expectations concerning the amount of inscrutable evils encountered in the world. Consequently, there remains a significant empirical hurdle for skeptical theism to overcome if it is to maintain its status as a defeater for our reliability when tracking gratuitous evils. |
Epicurean Cosmological Arguments for Matter's Necessity
One can find, through the writings of Lucretius, a powerful yet simple Epicurean argument for matter's (factual or metaphysical) necessity. In simplest terms, the argument is that since matter exists, and since nothing can come from nothing (in the sense that everything with an originating or sustaining efficient cause needs an originating or sustaining material cause, respectively), matter is eternal and uncreated. The argument can be strengthened in light of the scientific evidence for the conservation laws, according to which it’s at least physically impossible that matter-energy is created or destroyed. And if there are no supernatural beings that can annihilate matter-energy, the latter is at least de facto indestructible. Therefore, given the uncreated, eternal, and de facto indestructibility of matter-energy, it follows that matter-energy (or if matter-energy isn’t fundamental, whatever matter-energy is ultimately made of) is at least a factually necessary being.[1]
A stronger version of Epicurus' core argument can be developed by adding an appeal to something in the neighborhood of origin essentialism. The basic line of reasoning is that if being uncreated is a property of matter-energy in the actual world, then it is an essential property of matter-energy, in which case matter-energy in the actual world is essentially uncreated.
Yet stronger versions of the argument can go on from what is said above by appealing to a strong version of the principle of sufficient reason to argue that whatever plays the role of being eternal, essentially uncreated, and indestructible does not vary from possible world to possible world. But if not, then matter is a metaphysically necessary being.[2] On any version of the argument, however, we seem to get the conclusion that the universe requires no external sustaining cause, in which case, a fortiori, God is not required to play such a role.
The broadly Epicurean line of reasoning above can be seen as a cosmological argument of sorts, but one that concludes that matter-energy (or its ultimate constituents), and not an immaterial creator, is the uncaused cause of contingent, dependent, concrete reality. Let us therefore call any argument that deploys a material-cause version of the principle ex nihilo nihil fit to infer the factual or metaphysical necessity of matter (or matter's ultimate constituents) an Epicurean cosmological argument.
If successful, Epicurean cosmological arguments can be used to provide evidence in support of atheism over theism. For such arguments provide prima facie evidence that matter-energy (or its ultimate constituents) are factually or metaphysically necessary. But if so, then since it’s constitutive of classical theism that God is the creator of any material universe that happens to exist, then since an essentially uncreated universe exists in the actual world, and since essentially uncreated universes cannot, by definition, be created, it follows that the God of classical theism does not exist. Indeed, if, as many classical theists assert, God exists necessarily if he exists at all, then given that he doesn’t exist in the actual world, God exists in no possible world. In other words, God’s existence is metaphysically impossible.
----------------------------------------------
[1] Another line of reasoning comes from recent work on existential inertia (cf. Beaudoin, Audi, Oppy, and Schmid)
[2] Some other lines of reasoning: (i) The argument from necessitarianism about the laws of nature: Our specific laws of nature are essential to the universe (cf. Swoyer, Shoemaker, Bird et al.), including the conservation of matter-energy, in which case our universe is metaphysically necessary; (ii) The argument from quantum modal realism (cf. A. Wilson); (iii) the argument from L.A. Paul's one-category ontology; (iv) Gunn's argument for the fundamental constituents of matter as metaphysically necessary.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)