The Argument from Neo-Carnapian Metametaphysics

Rough draft.

Here's another argument to add to the list. According to a popular and well-motivated version of neo-Carnapian metametaphysics, the accidental, essential, and/or individuating properties attributed to an entity aren't "deep", but rather are attributed to an object via linguistic rules about the application-conditions of an expression used to denote a referent, where these rules are created and revised on the basis of our practical interests[1]. But if so, then there is non-trivial epistemic pressure to think the accidental, essential, and/or individuating properties we attribute to God aren't deep, either, but are likewise selected, negotiated, and revised on the basis of our practical interests. Indeed, the history of theological and philosophical reflection on the concept of the god of traditional monotheism seems to confirm this point, as theologians and philosophers of religion continue to tinker with the concept of God right up to the present. Furthermore, the reasons for doing so seem to clearly relate to issues of practical interest, such as, e.g., renegotiating and revising the medieval concept of God as absolutely simple, static, and impassible being to a dynamic, temporal, empathic being so as to align more closely with our personal wants and needs. Similarly for the recent trend of renegotiating and revising the gender-terms associated with God. But according to traditional monotheism, the accidental, essential, and/or individuating properties attributed to God are deep, and not carved out and negotiated on the basis of our practical interests. Therefore, to the extent that one is moved by the arguments for neo-Carnapian metametaphysics, one has a significant reason to doubt that our concept of the god of traditional monotheism carves reality at the joints[2]-- or even that there are mind-independent divine joints there to be carved in the first place.

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[1] Exceptions are the apparently innate concepts for agency, number, and the generic sortal for objects (cf. Carey's The Origin of Concepts). But as Thomasson argues, these were selected for by evolution to aid in survival and reproduction, and there is no reason to think their selection was truth-aimed. So while such concepts seem to be innate, they are like our non-innate concepts in the crucial sense of being produced primarily to serve our practical interests.

[2] One might object that the existence of the specifically traditional theistic god could be confirmed via inference to the best explanation (IBE), but Thomasson argues (a la Shalkowski, Saatsi, and others) that while IBE may be a legitimate form of inference in ordinary contexts (e.g., in confirming that a mouse is in the house via data such as small droppings, gnawed holes in food bags, etc.) and in the sciences, it isn't legitimate in metaphysics. This is because hypotheses of the former sorts can be independently confirmed in ordinary contexts (say, by waiting up to catch the mouse with a mousetrap), but not in metaphysics. Indeed, IBE itself can be independently confirmed as a reliable method of inference in ordinary contexts (via empirical feedback), but not in metaphysics.

Cameron's Forthcoming Book Critiquing Metaphysical Foundationalism

Be on the lookout for Ross Cameron's important forthcoming book, Chains of Being. It promises to pose a formidable challenge to metaphysical foundationalism, which is a standardly accepted commitment of classical theism. 

I've been interested in this issue since reading Ricki Bliss's excellent work on the possibility of metaphysical infinitism and metaphysical coherentism/holism in her dissertation and subsequent papers. It's exciting to see these views developed in a book-length monograph.

Schellenberg and Draper's New Paper on Renewal in Philosophy of Religion

Schellenberg, J.L. and Draper, Paul. "The Why and the How of Renewal in Philosophy of Religion", European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (1):1-20 (2022). Absolutely required reading. 

Saenz's New Critique of the Pruss-Rasmussen (2018) Cosmological Argument

 Saenz, Noel B. "On a Causal Principle in an Argument for a Necessary Being", Analysis (forthcoming).

Maitzen's New Book, Determinism, Death, and Meaning...

...is now out, and looks to be very good indeed. Here's the blurb and advanced praise:

This book offers new arguments for determinism. It draws novel and surprising consequences from determinism for our attitudes toward such things as death, regret, grief, and the meaning of life.

The book argues that rationalism is the right attitude to take toward reality. It then shows that rationalism implies determinism and that determinism has surprising and far-reaching consequences. The author contends that the existence of all of humanity almost certainly depends on the precise time and manner of your death and mine; that purely retrospective regret, relief, gratitude, and grief are irrational for all but those who hold extreme values; and that everyone’s life has an unending impact on the future and thereby achieves the strongest kind of meaning that it makes sense to desire.

Written in a direct and accessible style, Determinism, Death, and Meaning will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in metaphysics, philosophy of religion, and value theory, as well as general readers with a serious interest in these topics.

"This is a beautiful book. It is clearly and elegantly written, it addresses questions that are both large and important, and it defends bold and well thought-out answers to them. For those who are persuaded by its argument, the book is potentially life-changing." -- Professor Wes Morriston, University of Colorado, USA

"This is a breathtakingly original book. Whether or not you accept Maitzen’s rationalism and commitment to determinism, this is an extremely rich and insightful study of their implications. It has deeply influenced how I think about counterfactuals, regret, and death – the most exciting discussion of these topics that I have read in ages, clearly and engagingly written. Whether or not you are (and always were) determined to read it, you should." -- Professor Alan Hájek, Australian National University

Happy reading!

Karofsky's New Book Defending Necessitarianism...

 ...is now out. Here's the blurb:

This book is the first detailed and focused defense of necessitarianism. The author’s original account of necessitarianism encourages a reexamination of commonly held metaphysical positions as well as important issues in other, related areas of philosophy.

Necessitarianism is the view that absolutely nothing about the world could have been otherwise in any way, whatsoever. Most philosophers believe that necessitarianism is just plain false and presume that some things could have been otherwise than what they are. In this book, the author argues that necessitarianism is true and the view that some things in the world are contingent—what the author terms contingentarianism—is false. The author assesses various theories of contingency, including the possible worlds theory, combinatorialism, and dispositionalism, and argues that no theory can successfully explain why an entity is such as it is rather than not. She then lays out a case for necessitarianism and provides responses to various objections. The book concludes with an explanation of the ways in which necessitarianism is relevant to issues in ethics, philosophy of mind, and social philosophy.

A Case for Necessitarianism will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in metaphysics, logic, and philosophy of science.

For obvious reasons, the book should be of interest to philosophers of religion.

Climenhaga's New Paper Raises a Problem for Skeptical Theists

Climenhaga, Nevin. "If We Can't Tell What Theism Predicts, We Can't Tell Whether God Exists: Skeptical Theism and Bayesian Arguments from Evil", Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion (Vol. 11), forthcoming.

Abstract: According to a simple Bayesian argument from evil, the evil we observe is less likely given theism than given atheism, and therefore lowers the probability of theism. I consider the most common skeptical theist response to this argument, according to which our cognitive limitations make the probability of evil given theism inscrutable. I argue that if skeptical theists are right about this, then the probability of theism given evil is itself largely inscrutable, and that if this is so, we ought to be agnostic about whether God exists.