...or heaven. Here.
(wink)
PSR Without Necessary Concreta (of Any Sort)
As I mentioned in two previous posts, it's commonly thought that a naturalist can't plausibly accept the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), on the grounds that (i) she thereby commits herself to the existence of a metaphysically necessary being (more carefully, a metaphysically necessary concrete object), and that (ii) this is incompatible with any plausible version of naturalism. I critiqued (i) in the first of the two posts and (ii) in the second. Here I'd like to return to (i) and offer one more critique of it.
My previous criticism of (i) was that merely factually necessary beings are sufficient to satisfy a plausible version of PSR. Here my criticism shall be that a plausible version of PSR can be satisfied without appeal to necessary beings of any sort -- i.e., it can be satisfied merely in terms of continent, dependent beings. This sort of criticism goes back to Hume, of course, but William Lane Craig has tried to circumvent Hume's criticism in recent years. Therefore, as with the previous two posts on this topic, I'll use some of his work on the topic as my foil.
Perhaps the first thing that stands out about Craig’s version of PSR is that it’s a bit weaker than standard versions. Thus, a standard formulation of PSR can be expressed as follows:
(PSRs) There is an explanation for (a) the existence of every being, and for (b) the obtaining of every state of affairs.[1]
A standard criticism of PSRs is that clause (b) seems false, i.e., it seems that not all states of affairs can have an explanation. Craig states the standard criticism of PSRs tersely: "There cannot be an explanation of why there are any contingent states of affairs at all; for if such an explanation is contingent, then it, too, must have a further explanation, whereas if it is necessary, then the states of affairs explained by it must also be necessary."[2] In response to this criticism, Craig attempts to salvage a version of PSR by eliminating PSR(b), and just relying on PSR(a), i.e., by restricting the range of things needing an explanation to objects alone. He expresses his resultant version of PSR as:
(PSRc) Every existing thing has an explanation for its existence, either in terms of the necessity of its own nature or in terms of an external cause.[3]
Craig then deploys (PSRc) as premise (1) of his version of the Leibnizian cosmological argument to infer that a contingent universe requires an explanation in terms of a necessarily existent God. Craig expresses his version of the argument as follows:
1. Every existing thing has an explanation of its existence, either in terms of the necessity of its own nature or in terms of an external cause.
2. If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is God.
3. The universe is an existing thing.
4. Therefore, the universe has an explanation of its existence.
5. Therefore, the explanation of the existence of the universe is God.[4]
The argument is clearly valid. Furthermore, (4) follows from (1) and (3), and (5) follows from (2) and (4). That leaves (1), (2) and (3). Why should we accept them?
For the purposes of this post, I'm granting the truth of Craig's version of PSR, viz., his (1) above. Troubles arise, however, with (2) and (3). For Craig's use of 'the universe' is ambiguous in these premises. On the one hand, it might mean 'our universe', i.e., the (roughly) 13.7 billion year old entity that began with our Big Bang. But if this is Craig's intended referent of the term, then while (3) seems true, it's less than clear that (2) is true.[5] To see this, suppose there is a beginningless series of contingent universes such that each such being is explained in terms of its predecessor, as follows:
. . .C --> B --> A
In this series, A is explained by B, B is explained by C, and so on. But if so, then each contingent being in the series (including our universe) is explained by another contingent being. And if that's right, then PSRc is satisfied in such a scenario without an appeal to a necessarily existent God, in which case premise (2) is undercut.[6]
On the other hand, by 'the universe' Craig might mean 'all physical reality'. But if this is Craig's intended referent of the term, then whatever the merits of (2), it's not at all clear that (3) is true. For it's epistemically possible that there is more (perhaps much more) to physical reality than our universe. So, for example, our scenario above involving a beginningless series of contingent universes is such a possibility. But at least since the publication of Peter van Inwagen's Material Beings[7], it has become extremely unclear when – or even whether – two or more things compose a further thing. And if that’s right, then a fortiori it is controversial that all physical reality is a thing. Thus, whether the collection of all contingent things is itself a thing depends on which theory of material composition is correct. Universalists about material composition say that any two or more things is itself a thing. At the other end of the spectrum, nihilists about material composition say that no two things compose a thing -- there are only “simples” (or part-less beings) and their aggregates. Finally, moderates are those who fall somewhere in between universalists and nihilists, allowing that two or more things sometimes compose a thing, depending on whether they stand in a certain special relation to one another. So, for example, Peter van Inwagen’s moderate account entails that two or more things compose a new thing just in case they function together in such a way that their activities constitute a life.[8] For a moderate like van Inwagen, then, there are just two sorts of things: simples and living beings.
The problem this debate poses for Craig's argument is that each position has significant problems, in addition to their own set of strengths, and it's not clear how one should weigh each of these in determining which theory is correct.[9] It therefore seems that an adequate defense of (3) would require a widely persuasive defense of a position in the material composition debate that entails that the universe (i.e., all physical reality) is itself a thing. Now universalism entails that the universe is itself a thing, while nihilism entails that it is not, and it's at least conceivable that a moderate position could be developed that is more plausible than universalism and nihilism, and which entails that all physical reality is itself a thing. So an adequate defense of (3) would seem to require a defense of either a universalist account of material composition or a defense of a moderate account that meets the desiderata mentioned above.[10] Unfortunately, though, Craig has yet to offer such a defense.
To sum up the criticism expressed above: the expression, 'the universe' is ambiguous in (2) and (3) of Craig's Leibnizian cosmological argument. Either (a) it means 'our universe' or (b) it means 'all physical reality'. If (a), then (3) is undercut. For it leaves open the possibility that our contingent universe is explained in terms of an infinite regress of universes (or in any case of contingent beings), where each is the cause of its successor. And if (b), then (2) is undercut. For it's extremely controversial among those who specialize in the material composition debate whether the universe (i.e., all physical reality) is a thing. And in any case, it's not at all clear that it's the sort of entity that requires an explanation. Either way, Craig's argument appears to contain at least one dubious premise.
Craig has offered two main responses to the objections raised above. His first response is to argue that we can tell that the universe is a thing independently of an argument on behalf of a particular account of material composition. For here we can appeal to our intuitions, which indicate that the universe is, in fact, a thing -- or at least it was a thing, during the earliest stages of its existence: “ . . . the universe is obviously an existing thing (especially evident in its very early stages when its density was so extreme), possessing many unique properties such as a certain density, pressure, temperature, space-time curvature, and so on . . .”[11] In this way, Craig defends the standard reply that the collection of all contingent beings or things in the series is (or at least was) itself a being, in which case PSRc requires an explanation of the universe in terms of a necessary being.
His second response is to argue that the material composition debate can be sidestepped altogether, on the grounds that whether the universe is properly considered a thing or not, it is nonetheless the sort of entity that requires a cause or explanation: "I do not mean to pronounce here on ontological debates about what constitutes an object, but merely to claim that the universe is just as much a thing as are other familiar entities which we recognize to have causes, such as chairs, mountains, planets, and stars.”[12]
What to make of these responses? Now I’m inclined to agree with Craig that, at least in its earliest stages, our universe was a single existing thing, or at least the sort of entity that requires a cause or explanation in terms of one or more or other things. However, it’s not clear how this helps to answer the criticism raised above. For absent an independent argument that our universe is co-extensive with all physical reality, it’s epistemically possible that our universe is properly explained in terms of temporally prior processes involving other universes (or in any case, other natural contingent entities), and so on back ad infinitum. To answer the criticism above, therefore, it looks as though Craig will need to provide a reason for thinking that a collection of beings of the latter sort (i.e., a beginningless series of contingent universes) is itself a contingent being – or at least the sort of entity that requires a cause or explanation.
Unfortunately, the reasons we’ve looked at from his writings don’t look plausible when applied to the latter sort of case. For unlike our universe during its earliest stages, it’s just not clear that a beginningless series of contingent universes is itself a thing, or even (thing or not) an entity that requires a cause or explanation. It therefore looks as though the material composition debate cannot be sidestepped so easily after all.
In short, it looks as though Craig has more work to do in defending the Leibnizian cosmological argument against the criticisms raised here. Absent such a defense, even those who accept his version of PSR are left without a good reason for thinking there is a metaphysically or factually necessary being.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] This formulation is equivalent to that stated in Rowe, William. Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction, 4th ed. (Wadsworth, 2006), pp. 23.
[4] Cf. Craig, “The Cosmological Argument”, p. 114-116, esp. p. 114; Reasonable Faith, 3rd edition (Crossway, 2008), pp. 106-111, esp. p. 106. Craig notes his indebtedness to Stephen T. Davis for his formulation of the argument. Cf. Davis, “The Cosmological Argument and the Epistemic Status of Belief in God”, Philosophia Christi 1:1 (New Series) (1999), pp. 5-15.
[6] Craig is of course known for his arguments against the existence and traversability of actual infinites in relation to his defense of the kalam cosmological argument. Discussion of those arguments is beyond the scope of this post. However, I've discussed virtually all of Craig's (and Moreland's) arguments on this score on other occasions (e.g., here and here). I refer the interested reader to those posts.
[7] Cornell University Press, 1995.
[8] Cf. Material Beings.
[9] For an overview of the range of positions and their strengths and weaknesses, see (e.g.) Markosian, Ned. “Restricted Composition”, in Hawthorne, John, Theodore Sider, and Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics (Basil Blackwell), 2007, pp. 341-364.
[10] In this regard, it's worth reiterating that van Inwagen's own moderate account does not countenance the collection of all dependent beings -- whether construed as our own universe or as all physical reality - as itself a being or thing.
[11] “The Cosmological Argument”, p. 115,
[12] Ibid., p. 130, fn. 6.
My previous criticism of (i) was that merely factually necessary beings are sufficient to satisfy a plausible version of PSR. Here my criticism shall be that a plausible version of PSR can be satisfied without appeal to necessary beings of any sort -- i.e., it can be satisfied merely in terms of continent, dependent beings. This sort of criticism goes back to Hume, of course, but William Lane Craig has tried to circumvent Hume's criticism in recent years. Therefore, as with the previous two posts on this topic, I'll use some of his work on the topic as my foil.
Perhaps the first thing that stands out about Craig’s version of PSR is that it’s a bit weaker than standard versions. Thus, a standard formulation of PSR can be expressed as follows:
(PSRs) There is an explanation for (a) the existence of every being, and for (b) the obtaining of every state of affairs.[1]
A standard criticism of PSRs is that clause (b) seems false, i.e., it seems that not all states of affairs can have an explanation. Craig states the standard criticism of PSRs tersely: "There cannot be an explanation of why there are any contingent states of affairs at all; for if such an explanation is contingent, then it, too, must have a further explanation, whereas if it is necessary, then the states of affairs explained by it must also be necessary."[2] In response to this criticism, Craig attempts to salvage a version of PSR by eliminating PSR(b), and just relying on PSR(a), i.e., by restricting the range of things needing an explanation to objects alone. He expresses his resultant version of PSR as:
(PSRc) Every existing thing has an explanation for its existence, either in terms of the necessity of its own nature or in terms of an external cause.[3]
Craig then deploys (PSRc) as premise (1) of his version of the Leibnizian cosmological argument to infer that a contingent universe requires an explanation in terms of a necessarily existent God. Craig expresses his version of the argument as follows:
1. Every existing thing has an explanation of its existence, either in terms of the necessity of its own nature or in terms of an external cause.
2. If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is God.
3. The universe is an existing thing.
4. Therefore, the universe has an explanation of its existence.
5. Therefore, the explanation of the existence of the universe is God.[4]
The argument is clearly valid. Furthermore, (4) follows from (1) and (3), and (5) follows from (2) and (4). That leaves (1), (2) and (3). Why should we accept them?
For the purposes of this post, I'm granting the truth of Craig's version of PSR, viz., his (1) above. Troubles arise, however, with (2) and (3). For Craig's use of 'the universe' is ambiguous in these premises. On the one hand, it might mean 'our universe', i.e., the (roughly) 13.7 billion year old entity that began with our Big Bang. But if this is Craig's intended referent of the term, then while (3) seems true, it's less than clear that (2) is true.[5] To see this, suppose there is a beginningless series of contingent universes such that each such being is explained in terms of its predecessor, as follows:
. . .C --> B --> A
In this series, A is explained by B, B is explained by C, and so on. But if so, then each contingent being in the series (including our universe) is explained by another contingent being. And if that's right, then PSRc is satisfied in such a scenario without an appeal to a necessarily existent God, in which case premise (2) is undercut.[6]
On the other hand, by 'the universe' Craig might mean 'all physical reality'. But if this is Craig's intended referent of the term, then whatever the merits of (2), it's not at all clear that (3) is true. For it's epistemically possible that there is more (perhaps much more) to physical reality than our universe. So, for example, our scenario above involving a beginningless series of contingent universes is such a possibility. But at least since the publication of Peter van Inwagen's Material Beings[7], it has become extremely unclear when – or even whether – two or more things compose a further thing. And if that’s right, then a fortiori it is controversial that all physical reality is a thing. Thus, whether the collection of all contingent things is itself a thing depends on which theory of material composition is correct. Universalists about material composition say that any two or more things is itself a thing. At the other end of the spectrum, nihilists about material composition say that no two things compose a thing -- there are only “simples” (or part-less beings) and their aggregates. Finally, moderates are those who fall somewhere in between universalists and nihilists, allowing that two or more things sometimes compose a thing, depending on whether they stand in a certain special relation to one another. So, for example, Peter van Inwagen’s moderate account entails that two or more things compose a new thing just in case they function together in such a way that their activities constitute a life.[8] For a moderate like van Inwagen, then, there are just two sorts of things: simples and living beings.
The problem this debate poses for Craig's argument is that each position has significant problems, in addition to their own set of strengths, and it's not clear how one should weigh each of these in determining which theory is correct.[9] It therefore seems that an adequate defense of (3) would require a widely persuasive defense of a position in the material composition debate that entails that the universe (i.e., all physical reality) is itself a thing. Now universalism entails that the universe is itself a thing, while nihilism entails that it is not, and it's at least conceivable that a moderate position could be developed that is more plausible than universalism and nihilism, and which entails that all physical reality is itself a thing. So an adequate defense of (3) would seem to require a defense of either a universalist account of material composition or a defense of a moderate account that meets the desiderata mentioned above.[10] Unfortunately, though, Craig has yet to offer such a defense.
To sum up the criticism expressed above: the expression, 'the universe' is ambiguous in (2) and (3) of Craig's Leibnizian cosmological argument. Either (a) it means 'our universe' or (b) it means 'all physical reality'. If (a), then (3) is undercut. For it leaves open the possibility that our contingent universe is explained in terms of an infinite regress of universes (or in any case of contingent beings), where each is the cause of its successor. And if (b), then (2) is undercut. For it's extremely controversial among those who specialize in the material composition debate whether the universe (i.e., all physical reality) is a thing. And in any case, it's not at all clear that it's the sort of entity that requires an explanation. Either way, Craig's argument appears to contain at least one dubious premise.
Craig has offered two main responses to the objections raised above. His first response is to argue that we can tell that the universe is a thing independently of an argument on behalf of a particular account of material composition. For here we can appeal to our intuitions, which indicate that the universe is, in fact, a thing -- or at least it was a thing, during the earliest stages of its existence: “ . . . the universe is obviously an existing thing (especially evident in its very early stages when its density was so extreme), possessing many unique properties such as a certain density, pressure, temperature, space-time curvature, and so on . . .”[11] In this way, Craig defends the standard reply that the collection of all contingent beings or things in the series is (or at least was) itself a being, in which case PSRc requires an explanation of the universe in terms of a necessary being.
His second response is to argue that the material composition debate can be sidestepped altogether, on the grounds that whether the universe is properly considered a thing or not, it is nonetheless the sort of entity that requires a cause or explanation: "I do not mean to pronounce here on ontological debates about what constitutes an object, but merely to claim that the universe is just as much a thing as are other familiar entities which we recognize to have causes, such as chairs, mountains, planets, and stars.”[12]
What to make of these responses? Now I’m inclined to agree with Craig that, at least in its earliest stages, our universe was a single existing thing, or at least the sort of entity that requires a cause or explanation in terms of one or more or other things. However, it’s not clear how this helps to answer the criticism raised above. For absent an independent argument that our universe is co-extensive with all physical reality, it’s epistemically possible that our universe is properly explained in terms of temporally prior processes involving other universes (or in any case, other natural contingent entities), and so on back ad infinitum. To answer the criticism above, therefore, it looks as though Craig will need to provide a reason for thinking that a collection of beings of the latter sort (i.e., a beginningless series of contingent universes) is itself a contingent being – or at least the sort of entity that requires a cause or explanation.
Unfortunately, the reasons we’ve looked at from his writings don’t look plausible when applied to the latter sort of case. For unlike our universe during its earliest stages, it’s just not clear that a beginningless series of contingent universes is itself a thing, or even (thing or not) an entity that requires a cause or explanation. It therefore looks as though the material composition debate cannot be sidestepped so easily after all.
In short, it looks as though Craig has more work to do in defending the Leibnizian cosmological argument against the criticisms raised here. Absent such a defense, even those who accept his version of PSR are left without a good reason for thinking there is a metaphysically or factually necessary being.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] This formulation is equivalent to that stated in Rowe, William. Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction, 4th ed. (Wadsworth, 2006), pp. 23.
[2] Craig, “The Cosmological Argument”, p. 114. Cf. Rowe, William. The Cosmological Argument (Fordham University Press, 1998), pp. 103-111; Van Inwagen, Metaphysics, 2nd edition (Westview, 2002), pp. 119-122.
[3] Cf. Craig, “The Cosmological Argument”, in Copan, Paul and Paul K. Moser, eds. The Rationality of Theism (Routledge, 2003), p. 114; Reasonable Faith, 3rd edition (Crossway, 2008), p. 106.
[4] Cf. Craig, “The Cosmological Argument”, p. 114-116, esp. p. 114; Reasonable Faith, 3rd edition (Crossway, 2008), pp. 106-111, esp. p. 106. Craig notes his indebtedness to Stephen T. Davis for his formulation of the argument. Cf. Davis, “The Cosmological Argument and the Epistemic Status of Belief in God”, Philosophia Christi 1:1 (New Series) (1999), pp. 5-15.
[5] The following criticism is based on Peter van Inwagen's. See, for example, van Inwagen, Metaphysics, 2nd ed. (Westview, 2002), pp. 126-128.
[6] Craig is of course known for his arguments against the existence and traversability of actual infinites in relation to his defense of the kalam cosmological argument. Discussion of those arguments is beyond the scope of this post. However, I've discussed virtually all of Craig's (and Moreland's) arguments on this score on other occasions (e.g., here and here). I refer the interested reader to those posts.
[7] Cornell University Press, 1995.
[8] Cf. Material Beings.
[9] For an overview of the range of positions and their strengths and weaknesses, see (e.g.) Markosian, Ned. “Restricted Composition”, in Hawthorne, John, Theodore Sider, and Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics (Basil Blackwell), 2007, pp. 341-364.
[11] “The Cosmological Argument”, p. 115,
[12] Ibid., p. 130, fn. 6.
The 21st Century Monad Solution to the Problem of Evil
This is not the actual world!
Genius lyrics:
I admit I lost my faith
When I felt the shake from a Lisbon quake
And I could not believe
This is how things ought to be
So I wondered from place to place
But the evils of the human race
They made themselves apparent
That they were inherent
My life felt like someone else’s dream
And that’s when it came to me, and I could see
This is not the actual world
Yeah we’re in world 223
And a world like this must in some sense be
For God’s not choosing it to be praiseworthy
And what else could explain
This seeming random distribution of pleasure and pain?
On the just and the unjust alike
Falls the same rain
This theodicy it might seem odd
But it helped me make my peace with God, and now I see
This is not the actual world
You're welcome.
Genius lyrics:
I admit I lost my faith
When I felt the shake from a Lisbon quake
And I could not believe
This is how things ought to be
So I wondered from place to place
But the evils of the human race
They made themselves apparent
That they were inherent
My life felt like someone else’s dream
And that’s when it came to me, and I could see
This is not the actual world
Yeah we’re in world 223
And a world like this must in some sense be
For God’s not choosing it to be praiseworthy
And what else could explain
This seeming random distribution of pleasure and pain?
On the just and the unjust alike
Falls the same rain
This theodicy it might seem odd
But it helped me make my peace with God, and now I see
This is not the actual world
You're welcome.
Another Fine-Grained Analysis of the De Cruz Survey
Philosophers of religion rate PoR arguments differently than other philosophers. Details here.
Millikan's Reply to Plantinga
On other occasions, we noted Plantinga's "Content and Natural Selection" (CNS), which is (I believe) his most recent paper on the topic of his evolutionary argument against naturalism. In this short paper (forthcoming in PPR), Ruth Millikan argues that Plantinga has severely misread her theory of teleosemantics in CNS.
HT: Andrew Bailey
HT: Andrew Bailey
Naturalism and Necessary Beings (Very, Very Rough Draft)
(Revised a bit more in light of J.D.'s helpful comments)
As I mentioned in a previous post, it's commonly thought that a naturalist can't plausibly accept the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), on the grounds that (i) she thereby commits herself to the existence of a metaphysically necessary being (more carefully, a metaphysically necessary concrete object), and that (ii) this is incompatible with any plausible version of naturalism. In the previous post, I offered reasons to doubt (i). Here I'll briefly argue that (ii) is doubtful as well. As before, I'll use some remarks from William Lane Craig as my foil.
As a part of his defense of the Leibnizian cosmological argument, Craig has argued that the universe cannot plausibly be considered a metaphysically necessary being. He offers three main lines of argument for this conclusion: (1) our modal intuitions indicate that there could've been no universe at all, which is evidence that our universe isn't metaphysically necessary; (2) our modal intuitions indicate that there could've been a different universe, composed of different quarks, which is evidence that the universe isn't metaphysically necessary; and (3) there are good scientific arguments (esp. the ones in support of the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem) and philosophical arguments (viz., Craig's arguments against the existence and traversability of actual infinites) that the universe had an absolute beginning, which is evidence that our universe isn't metaphysically necessary. I find Craig's type-(3) arguments unpersuasive, for reasons I've discussed on other occasions. I will therefore ignore them here and focus on (1) and (2).
Start with (1): our modal intuitions indicate that there could've been no universe at all, which is evidence that our universe isn't metaphysically necessary. In support of this claim, Craig appeals to Charles Taliaferro's account of justification-conferring inferences from conceivability to possibility: "If one can conceive that a state of affairs obtain, and one has carefully considered whether the state of affairs is internally consistent (self-consistent at a minimum) and consistent with what one justifiably believes, then one has prima facie reason to believe it is possible for the state of affairs to obtain."[1] Therefore, if this account captures a correct principle of justified modal inference, then if you can conceive of the non-existence of the universe in this way (i.e., on reflection you find no internal inconsistency in the idea, and you find the idea to be consistent with what you justifiedly believe), then you thereby have prima facie reason to think the universe's non-existence is metaphysically possible. And if that's right, you have prima facie reason to think the universe is not a metaphysically necessary being.
What to make of this argument? Let's grant that we can conceive of the non-existence of the universe in the way sketched above. The concern is not with that step of Craig's argument, but rather with Craig's recommended principle of justified modal inference. Here I will just say that even if Craig's has identified a correct principle of justified modal inference, it's a dialectically ineffective tool if offered to the atheist or agnostic in the context of Craig's defense of the Leibnizian cosmological argument. To see this, consider a reflective agnostic who can conceive of God's non-existence as well. So, for example, she coherently conceives of eternal, uncreated, existentially independent matter in a godless universe. Furthermore, she finds that this conception remains intelligible to her after careful evaluation of its internal consistency, and of its consistency with the other things she justifiedly believes. Therefore, on Craig's recommended account of justifified modal inference, she has prima facie reason to believe that God's non-existence is likewise metaphysically possible.
Let's look at (2), then: our modal intuitions indicate that there could've been a different universe composed of different quarks (or with more quarks or less), which is evidence that the universe isn't metaphysically necessary. Now we've seen that Craig's preferred account of justified conceivability-possibility inferences is dialectally ineffective (at least in the present context). However, let's grant that even without an adequate account of justified modal inference in hand, we have a good deal of justified modal beliefs. Suppose we further grant that the possible existence of a universe composed of different quarks (or with more quarks or less) is among them. The problem is that we have similar modal intuitions about God: Assume the triune God of Christian theism exists. Why this God, instead of, say, a non-trinitarian God (e.g., the God of Islam)? Pending an adequate criterion of modal inference, this line of reasoning is a problem for the metaphysical necessity of both God and the universe if it's a problem for either one.
Beyond this, one could argue that much of the plausibility of the reasoning in (2) turns on the assumption that our universe is the only one there is. For if instead we live in a multiverse that contains all possible universes -- where all possible kinds, quantities, and configurations of quarks exist --, then much of the puzzlement about the universe's seeming particularity evaporates.
One might reply that there is a remaining puzzlement about why the multiverse exists at all, but we've seen that the same applies to God. We've further seen that Craig's preferred criterion of justified modal inference can't help us adjudicate between the modal status of the two broad hypotheses here (God and the material universe). It therefore seems that we are still in need of a reason to think that God, but not the universe, is a suitable candidate for a metaphysically necessary being.
---------------------------------------------
[1] "The Cosmological Argument", in Copan, Paul and Moser, Paul. The Rationality of Theism (Routldege, 2003), p. 130, fn. 8. Cf. Taliaferro, Charles. "Sensibility and Possibilia: A Defense of Thought Experiments", Philosophia Christi 3, 2 (new series) (2001), pp. 403-420. The account is given on p. 407. It should be noted that Craig endorses a slightly modified version of Talieferro's account, as he has removed the requirement that one form a mental image or visualization of the referent of a given thought experiment. I've read Craig's remarks in another venue that seem to indicate that this is intentional; he seems to reject imagination-based accounts of modal epistemology.
[2] One might attempt to get around these criticisms by offering a cogent ontological argument. If one could do that, then one could successfully argue that while the universe's non-existence is conceivable, God's is not. But if one had such an argument in hand, the Leibnizian cosmological argument would be superfluous. In any case, the ontological argument itself relies on an inference from conceivability to possibility, just as the cosmological argument under consideration here. Unfortunately, though, Craig's recommended criterion of modal inference seems to be just as dialectically ineffective in this context as it is in the context of the cosmological argument.
To see this, let's return to our reflective agnostic and follow along with her as she applies Craig's recommended criterion of modal inference to the key premise of the modal ontological argument (viz., that a necessarily existent Anselmian being is metaphysically possible). Thus, she finds no incoherence in the concept of an eternal, uncreated, free-standing universe devoid of a god. Furthermore, she finds no inconsistency between this concept and her other beliefs. So if Craig's recommended criterion of justified modal inference is correct, it follows that she has prima facie reason to think it's metaphysically possible for the scenario to obtain.
On the other hand, she also finds no internal incoherence in the concept of a necessarily existent Anselmian being, and she sees no inconsistency between this concept and her other beliefs (at least sans her newly acquired beliefs above. If we add those beliefs, then by Craig's criterion of modal inference, the claim that an Anselmian being is metaphysically possible is inconsistent with her other beliefs, in which case the latter is thereby defeated(!). But let's waive this problem here.) So if Craig's recommended criterion of justified modal inference is correct, it follows that she has prima facie reason to think it's metaphysically possible for the scenario to obtain.
Here's the thing, though: Our reflective agnostic of course also sees that the two beliefs are mutually inconsistent -- they can't both be true. For if a godless universe is metaphysically possible, then there is a metaphysically possible world at which God does not exist, in which case a necessary being is impossible (and the key premise of the modal ontological argument is false). On the other hand, if a necessarily existent Anselmian being is metaphysically possible, then an an Anselmian being exists in all metaphysically possible worlds, in which case a godless universe is metaphysically impossible (and the key premise of the modal ontological argument is true).
Thus, after reflecting on all of this, our agnostic finds that her prima facie reasons for believing each of the two modal propositions (i.e., that a godless universe is metaphysically possible, and that a metaphysically necessary Anselmian being is metaphysically possible) are undercut. She therefore finds herself undecided about the metaphysical possibility of an Anselmian being, and thus undecided on the key premise of the modal ontological argument. As with the cosmological argument, then, Craig's criterion of justified modal inference is of no help in vindicating God as a metaphysically necessary being via the ontological argument.
(I've offered a sketch of more general critique of the use of modal epistemology to vindicate the modal ontological argument on another occasion.)
As I mentioned in a previous post, it's commonly thought that a naturalist can't plausibly accept the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), on the grounds that (i) she thereby commits herself to the existence of a metaphysically necessary being (more carefully, a metaphysically necessary concrete object), and that (ii) this is incompatible with any plausible version of naturalism. In the previous post, I offered reasons to doubt (i). Here I'll briefly argue that (ii) is doubtful as well. As before, I'll use some remarks from William Lane Craig as my foil.
As a part of his defense of the Leibnizian cosmological argument, Craig has argued that the universe cannot plausibly be considered a metaphysically necessary being. He offers three main lines of argument for this conclusion: (1) our modal intuitions indicate that there could've been no universe at all, which is evidence that our universe isn't metaphysically necessary; (2) our modal intuitions indicate that there could've been a different universe, composed of different quarks, which is evidence that the universe isn't metaphysically necessary; and (3) there are good scientific arguments (esp. the ones in support of the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem) and philosophical arguments (viz., Craig's arguments against the existence and traversability of actual infinites) that the universe had an absolute beginning, which is evidence that our universe isn't metaphysically necessary. I find Craig's type-(3) arguments unpersuasive, for reasons I've discussed on other occasions. I will therefore ignore them here and focus on (1) and (2).
Start with (1): our modal intuitions indicate that there could've been no universe at all, which is evidence that our universe isn't metaphysically necessary. In support of this claim, Craig appeals to Charles Taliaferro's account of justification-conferring inferences from conceivability to possibility: "If one can conceive that a state of affairs obtain, and one has carefully considered whether the state of affairs is internally consistent (self-consistent at a minimum) and consistent with what one justifiably believes, then one has prima facie reason to believe it is possible for the state of affairs to obtain."[1] Therefore, if this account captures a correct principle of justified modal inference, then if you can conceive of the non-existence of the universe in this way (i.e., on reflection you find no internal inconsistency in the idea, and you find the idea to be consistent with what you justifiedly believe), then you thereby have prima facie reason to think the universe's non-existence is metaphysically possible. And if that's right, you have prima facie reason to think the universe is not a metaphysically necessary being.
What to make of this argument? Let's grant that we can conceive of the non-existence of the universe in the way sketched above. The concern is not with that step of Craig's argument, but rather with Craig's recommended principle of justified modal inference. Here I will just say that even if Craig's has identified a correct principle of justified modal inference, it's a dialectically ineffective tool if offered to the atheist or agnostic in the context of Craig's defense of the Leibnizian cosmological argument. To see this, consider a reflective agnostic who can conceive of God's non-existence as well. So, for example, she coherently conceives of eternal, uncreated, existentially independent matter in a godless universe. Furthermore, she finds that this conception remains intelligible to her after careful evaluation of its internal consistency, and of its consistency with the other things she justifiedly believes. Therefore, on Craig's recommended account of justifified modal inference, she has prima facie reason to believe that God's non-existence is likewise metaphysically possible.
Let's look at (2), then: our modal intuitions indicate that there could've been a different universe composed of different quarks (or with more quarks or less), which is evidence that the universe isn't metaphysically necessary. Now we've seen that Craig's preferred account of justified conceivability-possibility inferences is dialectally ineffective (at least in the present context). However, let's grant that even without an adequate account of justified modal inference in hand, we have a good deal of justified modal beliefs. Suppose we further grant that the possible existence of a universe composed of different quarks (or with more quarks or less) is among them. The problem is that we have similar modal intuitions about God: Assume the triune God of Christian theism exists. Why this God, instead of, say, a non-trinitarian God (e.g., the God of Islam)? Pending an adequate criterion of modal inference, this line of reasoning is a problem for the metaphysical necessity of both God and the universe if it's a problem for either one.
Beyond this, one could argue that much of the plausibility of the reasoning in (2) turns on the assumption that our universe is the only one there is. For if instead we live in a multiverse that contains all possible universes -- where all possible kinds, quantities, and configurations of quarks exist --, then much of the puzzlement about the universe's seeming particularity evaporates.
One might reply that there is a remaining puzzlement about why the multiverse exists at all, but we've seen that the same applies to God. We've further seen that Craig's preferred criterion of justified modal inference can't help us adjudicate between the modal status of the two broad hypotheses here (God and the material universe). It therefore seems that we are still in need of a reason to think that God, but not the universe, is a suitable candidate for a metaphysically necessary being.
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[1] "The Cosmological Argument", in Copan, Paul and Moser, Paul. The Rationality of Theism (Routldege, 2003), p. 130, fn. 8. Cf. Taliaferro, Charles. "Sensibility and Possibilia: A Defense of Thought Experiments", Philosophia Christi 3, 2 (new series) (2001), pp. 403-420. The account is given on p. 407. It should be noted that Craig endorses a slightly modified version of Talieferro's account, as he has removed the requirement that one form a mental image or visualization of the referent of a given thought experiment. I've read Craig's remarks in another venue that seem to indicate that this is intentional; he seems to reject imagination-based accounts of modal epistemology.
[2] One might attempt to get around these criticisms by offering a cogent ontological argument. If one could do that, then one could successfully argue that while the universe's non-existence is conceivable, God's is not. But if one had such an argument in hand, the Leibnizian cosmological argument would be superfluous. In any case, the ontological argument itself relies on an inference from conceivability to possibility, just as the cosmological argument under consideration here. Unfortunately, though, Craig's recommended criterion of modal inference seems to be just as dialectically ineffective in this context as it is in the context of the cosmological argument.
To see this, let's return to our reflective agnostic and follow along with her as she applies Craig's recommended criterion of modal inference to the key premise of the modal ontological argument (viz., that a necessarily existent Anselmian being is metaphysically possible). Thus, she finds no incoherence in the concept of an eternal, uncreated, free-standing universe devoid of a god. Furthermore, she finds no inconsistency between this concept and her other beliefs. So if Craig's recommended criterion of justified modal inference is correct, it follows that she has prima facie reason to think it's metaphysically possible for the scenario to obtain.
On the other hand, she also finds no internal incoherence in the concept of a necessarily existent Anselmian being, and she sees no inconsistency between this concept and her other beliefs (at least sans her newly acquired beliefs above. If we add those beliefs, then by Craig's criterion of modal inference, the claim that an Anselmian being is metaphysically possible is inconsistent with her other beliefs, in which case the latter is thereby defeated(!). But let's waive this problem here.) So if Craig's recommended criterion of justified modal inference is correct, it follows that she has prima facie reason to think it's metaphysically possible for the scenario to obtain.
Here's the thing, though: Our reflective agnostic of course also sees that the two beliefs are mutually inconsistent -- they can't both be true. For if a godless universe is metaphysically possible, then there is a metaphysically possible world at which God does not exist, in which case a necessary being is impossible (and the key premise of the modal ontological argument is false). On the other hand, if a necessarily existent Anselmian being is metaphysically possible, then an an Anselmian being exists in all metaphysically possible worlds, in which case a godless universe is metaphysically impossible (and the key premise of the modal ontological argument is true).
Thus, after reflecting on all of this, our agnostic finds that her prima facie reasons for believing each of the two modal propositions (i.e., that a godless universe is metaphysically possible, and that a metaphysically necessary Anselmian being is metaphysically possible) are undercut. She therefore finds herself undecided about the metaphysical possibility of an Anselmian being, and thus undecided on the key premise of the modal ontological argument. As with the cosmological argument, then, Craig's criterion of justified modal inference is of no help in vindicating God as a metaphysically necessary being via the ontological argument.
(I've offered a sketch of more general critique of the use of modal epistemology to vindicate the modal ontological argument on another occasion.)
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