Review of Kerr's Aquinas' Way to God: The Proof in De Ente Et Essentia

Caleb Cohoe reviews the book for NDPR.

New IEP Entry on Religious Disagreement

Here.

New Paper on Hume on Miracles

Ahmed, Arif. "Hume and the Independent Eyewitnesses", Mind (first published online August 2015). The paper offers a reply to the "independent witnesses" criticism raised by Earman, McGrew, et al. Here's the abstract:

The Humean argument concerning miracles says that one should always think it more likely that anyone who testifies to a miracle is lying or deluded than that the alleged miracle actually occurred, and so should always reject any single report of it. A longstanding and widely accepted objection is that even if this is right, the concurring and non-collusive testimony of many witnesses should make it rational to believe in whatever miracle they all report. I argue that on the contrary, even multiple reports from non-collusive witnesses lack the sort of independence that could make trouble for Hume.

And if a copy should find its way to my inbox...

UPDATE: Thanks!

Two Important New Books By J.L. Schellenberg...

...are now out:

The Hiddenness Argument: Philosophy's New Challenge to Belief in God (OUP, 2015).

Evolutionary Religion (OUP, 2015).

Also, be on the lookout for Adam Green & Eleanore Stump (eds.) Hidden Divinity and Religious Belief: New Perspectives (CUP, 2016), which is due to come out in January.

Substantially Revised SEP Entry on Descartes' Ontological Argument

Here.

Morriston's Important New Paper on Divine Command Theory

Morriston, Wes. "‘Terrible’ divine commands revisited: a response to Davisand Franks", Religious Studies (August 2015). Here's the abstract:

If God commanded something that would ordinarily be classified as a terrible evil, would we have a moral obligation to obey? In two previous articles in this journal, I examined and evaluated several different ways in which a divine command theorist might answer this question. Richard Brian Davis and W. Paul Franks have now provided a vigorous rebuttal, in which they argue that my way of handling the relevant counterpossible conditionals is flawed, and that a divine command theorist who avails herself of the metaphysical platform of theistic activism can consistently say that if (per impossibile) God were to command some terrible evil, it would not be the case that we have a moral obligation to do it. In the present article, I clarify my own view and defend it against Davis and Franks's objections. I also argue that the core claim of theistic activism – that there would be nothing at all if there were no God – does not have all the dramatic implications that Davis and Franks claim for it.