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Announcement: The 2011 St. Thomas Summer Seminar in Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology

The 2011 St. Thomas Summer Seminar in Philosophy of Religion and
Philosophical Theology

Recent PhDs and current graduate students are invited to apply to
participate in the 2011 St. Thomas Summer Seminar in Philosophy of
Religion and Philosophical Theology, a three-week long seminar
organized by Dean Zimmerman (Rutgers) and Michael Rota (University of
St. Thomas).

The seminar will be held at the University of St. Thomas, in St. Paul,
Minnesota, from June 13th to July 1st, 2011. Participants will receive
a stipend of $2900, as well as room and board. The deadline for
receipt of applications is December 1, 2010.

http://www.stthomas.edu/philosophy/templeton/project.html

Topics and speakers:

THE FINE-TUNING ARGUMENT

Robin Collins (Messiah College)
John Hawthorne (Oxford)
Bradley Monton (Colorado-Boulder)
Luke Barnes (Dept of Physics, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology,
Zurich)

EVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATIONS OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF

Justin Barrett (Oxford)
Jesse Bering (Queen's University)
John Greco (Saint Louis University)

DIVINE HIDDENNESS

J. L. Schellenberg (Mount Saint Vincent)
Peter van Inwagen (Notre Dame)

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

Paul Draper (Purdue)
Eleonore Stump (Saint Louis University)

For more information, including information on how to apply, go to

http://www.stthomas.edu/philosophy/templeton/project.html

This seminar program is funded by a generous grant from the John
Templeton Foundation.

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