Here. It's basically a plug for his new book, The Grand Design (due out September 7th!). It looks like the basic idea is that M-Theory is probably true, and that it explains the existence and fine-tuning of our universe. Hey, that's pretty much my view, too!
 Objection: "But I can imagine the fundamental stuff posited in the M-theory multiverse failing to exist. And since conceivability is sufficient evidence for possibility, it's possible for the fundamental stuff posited in the M-Theory multiverse to fail to exist, in which case we have reason to doubt that such stuff is metaphysically necessary, in which case it can't provide an ultimate explanation of the existence of our contingent universe. On the other hand, theism can explain such data. For it ultimately grounds the existence of our contingent universe in a factually or metaphysically necessary being, viz., God. Therefore, the hypothesis of a naturalistic M-theory multiverse fails to provide a better explanation of the existence of our contingent universe than theism."
Reply: Either conceivability is sufficient evidence of possibility or it isn't. If it isn't, then of course the data of the conceivable non-existence of an M-Theory multiverse isn't sufficient evidence of its possible non-existence, in which case the objection fails to show that the fundamental stuff of the M-theory multiverse isn't a metaphysically necessary being. On the other hand, suppose conceivability is sufficient evidence of possibility. Then since it's conceivable that both God and the M-theory multiverse fail to exist, then there's sufficient evidence that it's possble that both God and the M-theory multiverse fail to exist, in which case it looks as though no being of the relevant sort could be metaphysically necessary, in which case the jig is up for arguments from contingency, in which case contingency falls out of the range of data that needs explaining. Either way, then, the objection fails.
 I add the qualification that it's "pretty much" my view, since my view is the weaker one that the M-Theory hypothesis explains the data of the existence and fine-tuning of our universe at least as well as the theistic hypothesis, in which case such data doesn't favor theism over naturalism, in which case the existence and fine-tuning of our universe doesn't provide sufficient evidence for moving one from atheism or agnosticism to theism.