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Announcement: Templeton Dissertation Fellowships

The Templeton Dissertation Fellowships program in Evil, Pain, and
Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, hosted by the Center for Philosophy
of Religion at the University of Notre Dame, will provide up to three
one-year residential fellowships for the 2011 – 2012 academic year.,
with the possibility of a second year renewal in 2012. These
Fellowships fund research focused on the biological and psychological
nature and utility of pain and suffering, and/or the relations between
pain and suffering and the problem of evil.

Fellows will be expected to spend the year in residence at the
University of Notre Dame. Each successful applicant will receive a
$25,000 fellowship award, plus up to $5,000 for relocation, travel and
research. In addition, fellows will have joint access to funding to
bring in outside speakers and visitors for short periods during their
tenure, under the oversight of the fellowship directors (Logistical
and administrative details will be handled by the Center’s
administrative staff.)

For further details, including information about appropriate topics of
research, please visit www.evilandtheodicy.com and follow the
“Fellowships” and “Dissertation” links.

To apply, please submit the following materials electronically, if
possible, to cpreligion@nd.edu, or by mail to Michael Rea, Director,
Center for Philosophy of Religion, 418 Malloy Hall, University of
Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556:

• A complete curriculum vitae
• Three letters of recommendation
• A project abstract of no more than 150 words
• A project description of no more than 1200 words
• One published or unpublished paper

All application materials must be received by January 15, 2011 to
assure full consideration. Questions may be addressed to Michael Rea
at cpreligion@nd.edu.

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Notes on Mackie's "Evil and Omnipotence"

0. Introduction
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0.4 After his brief discussion of his version of the problem of evil, he considers most of the main responses to the problem of evil, and concludes that none of them work.

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1.2 Mackie’s reply:
1.2.1 this see…