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Announcement: 2014 St. Thomas Summer Seminar in Philosophy of Religion

The 2014 St. Thomas Summer Seminar in Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology

Recent PhDs and current graduate students in philosophy, theology, or religious studies are invited to apply to the 2014 St. Thomas Summer Seminar in Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology. The seminar will be held at the University of St. Thomas, in St. Paul, Minnesota, from June 17th to July 2nd, 2014. Participants will receive a stipend of $2000, as well as room and board. For more information and instructions on how to apply, go to:

  • Michael Bergmann and John Hawthorne on the epistemology of religious belief 
  • David Albert and Dean Zimmerman on cosmology and philosophy 
  • Louise Antony and Peter van Inwagen on the problem of evil 
  • John Greco on testimony and religious knowledge, and 
  • Stephen Davis, C. Stephen Evans, and Evan Fales on historical evidence and Christianity. 
The deadline for receipt of applications is December 1, 2013.

Organized by: Dean Zimmerman and Michael Rota

Funded by:
The John Templeton Foundation
The University of St. Thomas
The Society of Christian Philosophers
The University of Notre Dame’s Center for Philosophy of Religion
The John Cardinal O’Hara Chair in Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame
The Philosophy Department of Rutgers University


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