Skip to main content

Forthcoming Book on Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief

A while back, we noted an important conference at Purdue -- organized by Michael Bergmann and Patrick Kain -- on the challenges of disagreement and evolution to moral and religious beliefs. It looks as though many of the papers will be polished further and published in a collection:

Bergmann, Michael and Patrick Kain, eds. Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution (OUP, forthcoming). Below is the table of contents:

Michael Bergmann and Patrick Kain: Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Overview and Future Directions
I: Moral Disagreement and Religious Disagreement
1: Ralph Wedgwood: Moral Disagreement among Philosophers
2: Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Disagreements with Psychopaths
3: Robert Audi: Normative Disagreement as a Challenge to Moral Philosophy and Philosophical Theology
4: John Pittard: Conciliationism and Religious Disagreement
II: Disagreement Between Religious and Nonreligious Sources of Moral Belief
5: John Hare: Conscience and the Moral Epistemology of Divine Command Theory
6: Charles Mathewes: Theologies of Hell and Epistemological Conflict
7: Timothy Jackson: Not by "Reason" Alone, or Even First: The Priority of Sanctity over Dignity
8: Mark C. Murphy: Toward God's Own Ethics
9: Sharon Street: If Everything Happens for a Reason, Then We Don't Know What Reasons Are: Why the Price of Theism is Normative Skepticism
III: Evolutionary Debunking of Moral and Religious Belief
10: Sarah F. Brosnan: Why an Evolutionary Perspective is Critical to Understanding Moral Behavior in Humans
11: Dustin Locke: Darwinian Normative Skepticism
12: William J. FitzPatrick: Why There Is No Darwinian Dilemma for Ethical Realism
13: Richard Sosis and Jordan Kiper: Religion is More Than Belief: What Evolutionary Theories of Religion Tell Us about Religious Commitments
14: Joshua C. Thurow: Does the Scientific Study of Religion Cast Doubt on Theistic Beliefs?

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Epicurean Cosmological Arguments for Matter's Necessity

One can find, through the writings of Lucretius, a powerful yet simple Epicurean argument for matter's (factual or metaphysical) necessity. In simplest terms, the argument is that since matter exists, and since nothing can come from nothing, matter is eternal and uncreated, and is therefore at least a factually necessary being. 
A stronger version of Epicurus' core argument can be developed by adding an appeal to something in the neighborhood of origin essentialism. The basic line of reasoning here is that being uncreated is an essential property of matter, and thus that the matter at the actual world is essentially uncreated.
Yet stronger versions of the argument could go on from there by appealing to the principle of sufficient reason to argue that whatever plays the role of being eternal and essentially uncreated does not vary from world to world, and thus that matter is a metaphysically necessary being.
It seems to me that this broadly Epicurean line of reasoning is a co…

CfP: Inquiry: New Work on the Existence of God

NEW WORK ON THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
In recent years, methods and concepts in logic, metaphysics and epistemology have become more and more sophisticated. For example, much new, subtle and interesting work has been done on modality, grounding, explanation and infinity, in both logic, metaphysics as well as epistemology. The three classical arguments for the existence of God – ontological arguments, cosmological arguments and fine-tuning arguments – all turn on issues of modality, grounding, explanation and infinity. In light of recent work, these arguments can - and to some extent have - become more sophisticated as well. Inquiry hereby calls for new and original papers in the intersection of recent work in logic, metaphysics and epistemology and the three main types of arguments for the existence of God. 


The deadline is 31 January 2017. Direct queries to einar.d.bohn at uia.no.

Notes on Mackie's "Evil and Omnipotence"

0. Introduction
0.1 Mackie argues that the problem of evil proves that either no god exists, or at least that the god of Orthodox Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, does not exist. His argument is roughly the same version of the problem of evil that we’ve been considering.
0.2 Mackie thinks that one can avoid the conclusion that God does not exist only if one admits that either God is not omnipotent (i.e., not all-powerful), or that God is not perfectly good. 0.3 However, he thinks that hardly anyone will be willing to take this route. For doing so leaves one with a conception of a god that isn’t worthy of worship, and therefore not religiously significant.
0.4 After his brief discussion of his version of the problem of evil, he considers most of the main responses to the problem of evil, and concludes that none of them work.

1. First Response and Mackie's Reply
1.1 Response: Good can’t exist without evil; evil is a necessary counterpart to good.
1.2 Mackie’s reply:
1.2.1 this see…