Skip to main content

Call for Papers: The 3rd Annual University of Glasgow Philosophy of Religion Seminar

3rd Glasgow Philosophy of Religion Seminar
29-30th, May 2014

The biennial Glasgow Philosophy of Religion Seminar provides a platform for discussion of work in progress in analytic philosophy of religion. The Seminar is organized by the Forum for Philosophy and Religion and will be held in the Philosophy Building, University of Glasgow. The precise schedule will be announced nearer the time, but it is anticipated that the event will run from 10.00 a.m. on the 29th May until 6.00 p.m. on the 30th May. Details will appear here as they become available.

To register for this event please email Victoria Harrison ( Refreshments will be provided and there will be a buffet lunch on the 29th May (lunch on the 30th will be by own arrangement). A registration fee of £10 (£5 for graduate students) will be payable at the door.

This event is sponsored by the Royal Institute of Philosophy and Philosophy at the University of Glasgow.

Presentations are invited on any topic within analytic philosophy of religion, broadly construed to include non-western traditions. Papers on comparative philosophy of religion are also welcome. If you would like your work to be considered for presentation at this event please email an abstract of between 300 and 500 words to Victoria Harrison ( by 15th January 2014. Your paper should have a reading time of approximately 40 minutes. Please state on your submission if you are a graduate student. You will be informed of the decision by 28th February 2014. Papers accepted for presentation will be considered for publication in Philosophy Compass, Blackwell's fully peer-reviewed online philosophy journal.



Popular posts from this blog

Notes on Mackie's "Evil and Omnipotence"

0. Introduction
0.1 Mackie argues that the problem of evil proves that either no god exists, or at least that the god of Orthodox Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, does not exist. His argument is roughly the same version of the problem of evil that we’ve been considering.
0.2 Mackie thinks that one can avoid the conclusion that God does not exist only if one admits that either God is not omnipotent (i.e., not all-powerful), or that God is not perfectly good. 0.3 However, he thinks that hardly anyone will be willing to take this route. For doing so leaves one with a conception of a god that isn’t worthy of worship, and therefore not religiously significant.
0.4 After his brief discussion of his version of the problem of evil, he considers most of the main responses to the problem of evil, and concludes that none of them work.

1. First Response and Mackie's Reply
1.1 Response: Good can’t exist without evil; evil is a necessary counterpart to good.
1.2 Mackie’s reply:
1.2.1 this see…

Notes on Swinburne, "On Why God Allows Evil"

Notes on Swinburne’s “Why God Allows Evil”

1. The kinds of goods a theistic god would provide: deeper goods than just “thrills of pleasure and times of contentment” (p. 90). For example:
1.1 Significant freedom and responsibility
1.1.1 for ourselves
1.1.2 for others
1.1.3 for the world in which they live
1.2 Valuable lives
1.2.1 being of significant use to ourselves
1.2.2 being of significant use to each other

2. Kinds of evil
2.1 Moral evil: all the evil caused or permitted by human beings, whether intentionally or through negligence (e.g., murder, theft, etc.)
2.2 Natural evil: all the rest: evil not caused or permitted by human beings (e.g., suffering caused by hurricanes, forest fires, diseases, animal suffering, etc.)

3. The gist of Swinburne’s answer to the problem of evil: God cannot – logically cannot -- give us the goods of significant freedom, responsibility and usefulness without thereby allowing for the possibility of lots of moral and natural evil. This is why he has al…