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Call for Papers: The 3rd Annual University of Glasgow Philosophy of Religion Seminar


3rd Glasgow Philosophy of Religion Seminar
29-30th, May 2014

The biennial Glasgow Philosophy of Religion Seminar provides a platform for discussion of work in progress in analytic philosophy of religion. The Seminar is organized by the Forum for Philosophy and Religion and will be held in the Philosophy Building, University of Glasgow. The precise schedule will be announced nearer the time, but it is anticipated that the event will run from 10.00 a.m. on the 29th May until 6.00 p.m. on the 30th May. Details will appear here as they become available.

To register for this event please email Victoria Harrison (Victoria.Harrison@glasgow.ac.uk). Refreshments will be provided and there will be a buffet lunch on the 29th May (lunch on the 30th will be by own arrangement). A registration fee of £10 (£5 for graduate students) will be payable at the door.

This event is sponsored by the Royal Institute of Philosophy and Philosophy at the University of Glasgow.

CALL FOR PAPERS
Presentations are invited on any topic within analytic philosophy of religion, broadly construed to include non-western traditions. Papers on comparative philosophy of religion are also welcome. If you would like your work to be considered for presentation at this event please email an abstract of between 300 and 500 words to Victoria Harrison (Victoria.Harrison@glasgow.ac.uk) by 15th January 2014. Your paper should have a reading time of approximately 40 minutes. Please state on your submission if you are a graduate student. You will be informed of the decision by 28th February 2014. Papers accepted for presentation will be considered for publication in Philosophy Compass, Blackwell's fully peer-reviewed online philosophy journal.

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