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A Quadrilemma Against the Possibility-Premise of Standard Modal Ontological Arguments

Plantinga’s modal ontological argument relies on the premise that God’s necessarily existent essence is instantiated or made concrete in at least one metaphysically possible world. The following argument challenges that possibility by considering in general how any abstract essence might be made concrete or possibly instantiated from within the total space of abstract possibilities. In general, if an entity’s abstract nature is ever made concrete, it must occur via some kind of “instantiator.” There are four logical possibilities for how this might happen:

• (a) Instantiation occurs entirely by an abstract mechanism inherent to the essence itself.

• (b) Instantiation is brought about solely by a concrete agent external to the essence.

• (c) Instantiation is accomplished by a purely abstract mechanism that is partly internal to the essence and partly derived from external abstract entities.

• (d) Instantiation involves a hybrid process that is partly internal (abstract) and partly external (concrete).

Here's the rub. When applied to God’s abstract essence, each of these possibilities creates a tension with traditional theism:

1. Self-Instantiation by an Internal Abstract Agent (a):

If God’s essence instantiates itself through a wholly abstract internal mechanism, then abstract entities would have the capacity to bring themselves into concrete existence. This would imply that other abstract entities might also self-instantiate, contradicting the exclusive nature of God’s self-sufficiency as envisioned in traditional theism.

2. Instantiation by an External Concrete Agent (b):

If instantiation requires a completely external, concrete agent, then something outside of God must do the instantiating. However, traditional theism posits that God is the ultimate and sole ground of all existence, leaving no room for an external instantiator.

3. Joint Instantiation with Other Abstract Entities (c):

Should the process involve an abstract agent partly internal to God and partly drawn from other abstract entities, it would suggest that God’s essence is not unique in its capacity to be instantiated. This again implies that other abstract entities could potentially share in such instantiation, which is at odds with traditional theistic claims.

4. Mixed Abstract and Concrete Instantiation (d):

Finally, if the instantiation involves both an internal abstract component and an external concrete component, it inherits the issues from both (a) and (b): it presupposes self-instantiation while also requiring an external instantiator, a combination that contradicts the traditional view of God’s unique, self-sufficient nature.

Summing up: if we accept the premise that God’s necessarily existent essence is possibly instantiated in any metaphysically possible world—as required by Plantinga’s modal ontological argument—we encounter a quadrilemma. Every potential account for how such instantiation might occur ends up generating problems that are incompatible with the core tenets of traditional theism. In this way, the assumption that God’s essence can be instantiated poses a serious challenge to Plantinga’s argument and similar modal formulations, calling into question the coherence of their possibility premise--and perhaps the very possibility of traditional monotheism.

Two Naturalistic Arguments for Why There is Something (Concrete) Rather Than Nothing (Concrete)

Here is a sketch of two arguments for why there is anything (concrete) rather than nothing (concrete), which are based on, or at least inspired by, ideas found in Spinoza's Ethics and Leibniz's "On the Ultimate Origination of Things":

Spinozistic Argument: Essences are ideas. Judgements are part of the essence of ideas. Judgements assert the truth of coherent ideas, and assert the falsity of incoherent ideas. Ideas/essences are therefore active and powerful--they have the power to do things/make their referents obtain or fail to obtain. Therefore, if there is no inconsistency in the essence of an idea, its corresponding judgement will affirm its truth, and thereby bring it about/make the idea concrete. Therefore, all possible essences become concrete on their own. Therefore, the reason why there is anything concrete rather than nothing concrete is that at least some abstract essences/ideas are internally coherent, and these intrinsically actualize themselves/make themselves concrete.

Leibnizian Argument: Unactualized possibilities have a natural, innate tendency or striving to actualize themselves unless they are impeded by something external to them. Therefore, the reason why there is anything concrete rather than nothing is that some unactualized possibilities were not impeded in their innate, natural tendency to actualize themselves by things external to them.

I note that both arguments provide a rationale for Negative PSR, the latter of which we've discussed on other occassions. If Negative PSR is true, then the default presumption is that mere possibilia will become actual unless there exists some countervailing element that prevents them from actualizing, in which case the epistemic force of the "why is there some (concrete) rather than nothing?" question is undercut.

A Quick Objection to the Modal Ontological Argument

(From an old Facebook post of mine back in 2018)
Assume Platonism about properties, propositions, and possible worlds. Such is the natural backdrop of the modal ontological argument. Assume further that the key possibility premise of the modal ontological argument is true, viz., that there is a possible world at which maximal excellence is exemplified. Then by Axiom S5 and that premise, we get the God of classical theism -- or do we? Seems to me we don't. For the picture is that God is ontologically posterior to and dependent upon the existence and ontological structure of the platonic multiverse -- God's existence is the ontological consequence of the nature and structure of platonic space. But if that's right, then God is, in a real sense, a dependent being, in which case classical theism is false.