Metaethical expressivism is a powerful and popular theory of the nature of moral statements. However, the theory entails that there are no moral facts. This is surprising on theism, since on that view, there are moral facts, and God has moral attributes that seem to entail the existence of moral facts about his/her nature. By contrast, the non-existence of moral facts isn't surprising on naturalism, since it seems to make no predictions about the existence of moral facts. Therefore, those who accept metaethical expressivism thereby have at least some grounds for naturalism vis-a-vis theism.
Quick Links
- Book
- 200 (or so) Arguments for Atheism
- Index: Assessing Theism
- Why Mainstream Scholars Think Jesus Was A Failed Apocalyptic Prophet
- What's Wrong With Plantinga's Proper Functionalism?
- Draper's Critique of Behe's Design Argument
- The Failure of Plantinga's Free Will Defense
- 100 Arguments for God Answered
- Thomistic Arguments for God Answered
- On a Common Apologetic Strategy
- On Caring About and Pursuing Truth
- A Priori Naturalism, A Priori Inerrantism, and the Bible
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