Hill, Scott. "Why God Allows Undeserved Horrendous Evil", Religious Studies (Online First 28 Sept. 2021). In the paper, Hill applies recent work on the non-identity problem in ethics to the problem of evil. Vince Vitale has recently written a monograph applying insights from the non-identity problem literature to the problem of evil as well. Required reading for anyone working on the problem of evil today.
6 comments:
Thanks so much for the shout out Felipe! I did an interview about the paper here:
https://adherentapologetics.com/2021/12/03/animals-suffer-because-if-they-didnt-you-wouldnt-exist-the-non-identity-theodicy-w-dr-scott-hill/
Hi Scott,
You bet. Looking forward to reading the interview!
There is this paper published in an obscure journal that offers a different perspective.
If God Didn’t Satisfice, We Could Still Exist by Rick Repetti
http://researcherslinks.com/current-issues/If-God-Did-not-Satisfice-We-Could-Still-Exist/9/5/163/html
“ I argue that this thesis is inconsistent with the theology informing Adams’s theodicy. That theology identifies us not as our bodies, but as our nonphysical souls. On that theology’s “identity thesis,” identity of subjects of experience is preserved through conception, life, death, and the after-life, and thus is capable of preservation in alternate bodies. Thus, God could have created us as better beings in a better world, exhibiting grace and avoiding imperfection. Thus, (b) cannot support God’s satisficing. I entertain an objection that God could create souls whose identities vary with their bodies, but reply that He could create souls whose identities do not vary trans-corporeally.”
There is this paper published in an obscure journal that offers a different perspective.
If God Didn’t Satisfice, We Could Still Exist by Rick Repetti
http://researcherslinks.com/current-issues/If-God-Did-not-Satisfice-We-Could-Still-Exist/9/5/163/html
“ I argue that this thesis is inconsistent with the theology informing Adams’s theodicy. That theology identifies us not as our bodies, but as our nonphysical souls. On that theology’s “identity thesis,” identity of subjects of experience is preserved through conception, life, death, and the after-life, and thus is capable of preservation in alternate bodies. Thus, God could have created us as better beings in a better world, exhibiting grace and avoiding imperfection. Thus, (b) cannot support God’s satisficing. I entertain an objection that God could create souls whose identities vary with their bodies, but reply that He could create souls whose identities do not vary trans-corporeally.”
Awesome. Thanks John. I'll take a look!
On a quick read I thought it was an interesting paper. I took the main worry to be this. If we're souls, then origin essentialism doesn't apply.
I don't agree with that claim. It seems to me that even if we are souls, different processes could be used to get duplicate souls. So God could create a soul ex nihilo. But God could also endow physical processes with the ability to create souls. And a physical process could create a duplicate of the soul God creates ex nihilo. But they'd originate through different processes. A soul having a physical origin and a soul having an ex nihilo origin arise through different processes. So the two souls would be different.
Follow up questions and objections welcome!
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