Rough Draft.
If theistic conceptualism is true, then either there are constraints on what God can think, and thus on the space of possibilities (since possible worlds are standardly taken to be among the entities God's intellectual activity is supposed to ground on theistic conceptualism), or there aren't. If there are, then there are modal facts about what God can and can't think that aren't accounted for by theistic conceptualism, in which case theistic conceptualism looks unmotivated. On the other hand, if there aren't constraints on what God can think, and thus no such constraints on the space of possibilities, then God has the ability to structure the space of possible worlds such that the doctrine of possible universal transworld depravity (PUTD) -- the core thesis of Plantinga's free will defense (FWD) -- is false. Now either PUTD is true or it's false. If it's true, then (under the assumption of the horn of the dilemma that there are no such constraints on the space of possibilities) it's God's fault that it's true, since he could've made the space of possibilities such that it's false (e.g., by generating a distribution of the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom so that it conforms to a pattern of intraworld plenitude, rather than one that conforms to one of interworld plenitude), in which case the old logical problem of evil comes roaring back. On the other hand, if it's false, then (again, still under the assumption of the same horn of the dilemma) Plantinga's FWD fails. (This seems especially problematic for Plantinga, since he's in print as a defender of theistic conceptualism.)
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