Sanford Goldberg's Important Case for Religious Disagreement as a Defeater for Religious Belief

Read these papers:

Goldberg, Sanford C. “Does Externalist Epistemology Rationalize Religious Commitment?” In Timothy O’Connor and Laura Frances Callahan, eds., Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue. Oxford University Press, 2013.

-----. "How Confident Should a Believer Be in the Face of Religious Pluralism?" In Matthew A. Benton and Jonathan L. Kvanvig, eds. Religious Disagreement and Pluralism. Oxford University Press, 2022.

For further contextualization and for his line of response to the worry of overgeneralizing, see his "Defending Philosophy in the Face of Systematic Disagreement", in Diego E. Machuca, ed., Disagreement and Skepticism. Routledge, 2013.

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