Teehan, John. "Cognitive Science, Evil, and God", in DeCruz and Nichols, Eds. Advances in Religion, Cognitive Science, and Experimental Philosophy. Bloomsbury, 2017, 39-60. (Podcast here)
This chapter explores the implications of the Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) for the philosophical problem of evil, particularly how it challenges theistic beliefs.
Introduction to CSR and God-Beliefs (p. 39-40)
What is CSR? The Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) uses various disciplines and methods from cognitive sciences to study religious phenomena.
Natural Origin of Belief: A core idea in CSR is that belief in gods doesn't require special brain parts, mystical experiences, or brainwashing. Instead, such beliefs arise from the natural functioning of normal mental tools in common social and natural contexts. These mental tools evolved to help our ancestors survive and reproduce.
Two Systems of Thinking:
System 1: This system involves mental processes that are quick, automatic, and mostly unconscious. It leads to strong intuitions that shape how we see and react to the world. Religious beliefs are largely products of System 1, making them intuitively compelling and emotionally rich. Examples of System 1 tools contributing to god-beliefs include an Agency Detection Device (sensing the presence of agents), Theory of Mind (attributing thoughts and intentions to others), Promiscuous Teleology (seeing purpose in things), and Common Sense Dualism (intuitively separating mind and body).
System 2: This involves slower, more deliberate, and rational thought processes that we typically associate with conscious reasoning. While important, System 2 processes are generally weaker than the intuitive outputs of System 1.
Social Function of Religion: There's a general agreement in CSR that religion has played a role in human social evolution by helping to unite groups and ensure they function cohesively. While the exact timing and mechanisms are debated, the idea that religion served a key moral function for human societies is widely accepted.
Implications of CSR for Religious Belief (p. 40-42)
CSR as a Challenge: CSR provides a naturalistic, empirically grounded explanation for how god-beliefs form and why they are compelling, even if God doesn't exist. This makes CSR a potentially serious empirical challenge to religious belief.
Theistic Response – "Cognitively Compatible Theism" (cTheism):
Some scholars argue that CSR findings don't necessarily undermine Christian belief or show that belief in God is irrational.
The reasoning is that God could have "fine-tuned" evolution, including cognitive evolution, to produce beings capable of knowing Him. Evolutionary forces, including those shaping our minds, could be seen as tools used by God.
This view, termed "cognitively compatible Theism" or "cTheism," suggests that our god-generating cognitive mechanisms are simply God's way of revealing Himself. It's an updated form of natural theology, where belief in God is framed to be compatible with scientific findings.
A Deeper Problem for cTheism:
The analogy with how theology adapted to biological evolution (by placing God as the designer of the process) isn't perfect. Biological evolution doesn't directly explain belief itself, but cognitive evolution does.
The belief that "God designed cognitive evolution" is itself a belief that falls under the scope of CSR.
Therefore, the crucial question isn't just whether it's logically possible for God to have designed cognitive evolution, but whether we have good reasons, in light of CSR, to believe He did so.
The Unnoticed Challenge – Problem of Evil: The chapter aims to explore how CSR informs the problem of evil, arguing that a cTheism consistent with CSR findings about god-beliefs cannot also be made consistent with a CSR-based understanding of evil.
Cognitive Evolution, Morality, and Evil (p. 43-46)
cTheism Implies God-Designed Morality: If God guided cognitive evolution for us to know Him (cTheism), then this guidance must also apply to our morality-generating mechanisms. This is especially true for the Theistic God, who is understood as an essentially moral being concerned with human morality. CSR findings also link god-beliefs and morality. Thus, our evolved moral cognition would also be a revelation of God's nature.
Evolutionary Function of Morality:
Humans are unique in their ability to live cooperatively in large, complex social groups.
Morality evolved as a system to promote pro-social behavior and discourage socially costly behavior, addressing the tension between individual fitness and group stability. Individuals invest in the group, which acts as a long-term investment in their own fitness, but this only works if others also cooperate.
Morality as an In-Group Adaptation:
A key feature of evolved morality is that it's primarily an "in-group" adaptation. The group is where individuals pursue their fitness, find protection, and raise offspring.
Moral concern is therefore strongly biased towards in-group members. Those outside the group often don't trigger the same moral intuitions and can even trigger fear or threat responses.
This in-group/out-group moral divide is the source of both positive human behaviors (compassion, sacrifice for the in-group) and negative ones (xenophobia, racism, tribalism – which are types of moral evil).
Proximate vs. Ultimate Causes of Moral Behavior:
Evolutionary theory focuses on "ultimate causes" (how a trait affects reproductive success). For example, parental investment ultimately serves to pass on genes.
However, human behavior is typically driven by "proximate causes" (the immediate psychological or physiological mechanisms). Parents invest in children due to love and pride (proximate causes), not conscious calculations of genetic returns.
Empathy as a Key Proximate Cause:
Empathy – the capacity to recognize and respond to others' emotional states – is a crucial proximate cause of moral behavior. It has a neurological basis and often operates automatically as part of System 1 thinking.
Damage to empathy systems, as seen in psychopaths, is linked to a deficient capacity for emotional empathy and can lead to cruel behavior. Psychopaths may understand others are in pain (cognitive empathy) but not feel distress themselves (emotional empathy).
This suggests much evil (undeserved suffering humans inflict on others) can originate from the workings (or mis-workings) of the human brain.
The cTheist Response and a Deeper Problem:
A cTheist might argue that evil resulting from damaged empathy systems isn't God's fault, as these systems aren't working as God designed them.
However, this still raises questions about a divine design that can go so wrong. More importantly, it doesn't address evil committed by humans with normally functioning brains.
The Cognitive Bases of Moral Evil (p. 46-49)
Modulation of Empathy: While empathy has a bottom-up neurological basis (automatic System 1 response), it can be influenced by top-down cultural and experiential factors. For instance, learning can expand or inhibit empathetic responses.
Evolved Priming of Empathy: The brain seems particularly attuned to respond to evolved moral concerns, such as identifying cheaters, cooperators, and, crucially, in-group/out-group distinctions.
We are neurologically wired to be more empathetic towards in-group members and less sensitive (or even hostile) to out-group members.
Studies show reduced empathetic brain responses to suffering out-group members or those perceived as "cheaters". In some cases, seeing an out-group member in pain might even activate reward centers in the brain (for males, regarding cheaters).
This bias applies to racial and cultural in-groups, and even artificially created "minimal groups".
Extreme out-group members (e.g., low-status individuals) may not even register as persons in the brain but as objects of disgust, to be avoided or eliminated.
Evil from Normally Functioning Brains:
The evolved moral bias against out-groups, which is neurologically instantiated, is a psychological basis for prejudice, discrimination, and dehumanization, and the violence that follows.
Crucially, this type of moral evil results not from damaged brains, but from the brain working as it was designed by evolution to work.
Implication for cTheism:
If God designed our cognitive evolution as the means to reveal Himself (cTheism), then these cognitively based evils (like in-group bias leading to out-group cruelty) are predictable, even inevitable, results of God's moral design.
The suffering isn't just collateral damage; the moral bias against other groups is a design feature of our evolved moral minds.
If God knew this would be the case, God bears responsibility for this moral evil.
This makes it difficult for cTheism to be compatible with both the CSR account of god-revelation and a defense of God against the problem of evil arising from this same cognitive architecture. This cognitive science of evil thus threatens to debunk cTheism.
Exploring Potential Theodicies (cTheodicies) (p. 49-55)
The chapter now considers if a "cognitively compatible theodicy" (cTheodicy) could be constructed to defend cTheism against the challenge from the cognitive science of evil.
1. Original Sin Theodicy (p. 49-53)
The Proposal: Perhaps God endowed us with a moral cognition aimed at love and justice, but something went wrong due to "original sin". This sin corrupted our cognition, leading to moral evil like in-group bias. God then provides a "fix" through revelation (e.g., Scripture). Evil is thus a deviation from, not a natural outcome of, God's design.
Problems with Original Sin Theodicy:
Inconsistency with Natural History: The concept of original sin (especially a literal historical fall of an original pair) is hard to reconcile with a naturalistic evolutionary account of human origins. Even metaphorical interpretations of Adam and Eve implying a "moral fall" at some point in human species development are problematic because there's no evidence of a pristine moral state from which to fall. The in-group/out-group bias has deep evolutionary roots predating humans.
Alternative "Ensoulment" View: One might argue that primitive in-group bias was part of the ascent, and "ensoulment" gave us a moral perspective to resist this, with original sin being the failure to embrace this higher perspective. However, there's no historical evidence of a period of inclusive love that then gave way to in-group bias due to sin. Original sin doesn't fit natural history or CSR evidence, which shows in-group bias as a natural inclination.
Scripture Doesn't "Fix" In-Group Bias; It Sanctions It: Even if original sin corrupted our moral cognition, the proposed "fix" (revelation in Scripture) doesn't solve the problem because Scripture itself often endorses and gives divine sanction to in-group moral bias.
Examples: The command "You shall not murder" in the Hebrew Bible often doesn't apply to out-group members, who could be killed and their women/children taken as booty (Deut. 20:13-16). The conquest of the Promised Land is portrayed as genocidal (Deut. 3:4-6). This dehumanizing attitude reflects a morality designed to promote in-group fitness, sanctifying the bias rather than correcting it.
The New Testament also shows this moral psychology, though the in-group boundary shifts from ethnicity to belief in Christ. Christ's teachings emphasize a divide between those "with me" and "against me," with severe consequences for the out-group (Luke 11:23, Matt. 10:32-33, Matt. 25:32-41, Matt. 13:40-43). The out-group can be characterized as non-human ("weeds") to be destroyed.
Scripture's Dual Nature: While Scripture also contains inspiring exhortations to justice and love that can expand moral community, it simultaneously promotes moral insensitivity and cruelty towards out-groups under divine sanction. This makes it inconsistent with the claim that Scripture is a divine fix for a corrupted moral cognition.
Conclusion on Original Sin Theodicy: Instead of absolving God, this theodicy, when combined with the nature of Scripture, reinforces God's culpability for evil that follows from a divinely designed (and then divinely sanctioned) moral bias. This cTheodicy fails.
2. An Irenaean cTheodicy (p. 53-55)
The Proposal (based on Irenaeus, elaborated by John Hick): Humanity wasn't created perfect but spiritually and morally immature. Our failings aren't from a discrete original sin but from this initial immaturity. We are in a "person-making world" where challenges help us develop.
Applied to CSR: Our god-generating cognitive tools aren't unreliable; they are "spiritually imprecise or coarse-grained," designed to make us aware of a general divine/moral dimension of reality, which is then refined through Scripture and theological reflection. This allows meaningful participation in God's creation.
The Theodicy Aspect: Moral evil is an inevitable consequence of having spiritually/morally immature creatures. The justification for such creatures is the greater good of achieving "full realization of human potential in a spiritual and moral perfection within the divine kingdom".
Problems with Irenaean cTheodicy:
Scriptural Refinement Issue: As argued before, Scripture itself is structured by our evolved moral cognition and tends to endorse in-group bias, rather than consistently refining us towards universal moral perfection.
The Slippery Slope of Refinement: If Scripture needs refinement by theology, and theology itself needs ongoing refinement (e.g., moving from Augustinian to Irenaean models, which may also need further refinement), at what point does this process stop?.
No Objective End-Point: If there's no clear, objective standard to determine the end of this refinement process, any theological system (including belief in the personal, Supreme Being of Theism) can only be accepted provisionally and is open to future rejection. Theism itself might just be another primitive stage, like animism or polytheism.
Conclusion on Theism in Light of Cognitive Science of Evil (p. 55-56)
CSR Reveals Deep-Seated Propensity to Evil: A cognitive scientific model of morality shows that the propensity to evil (especially from in-group/out-group dynamics) is deeply built into our nature as a product of our evolved cognitive processes, not a fall from grace.
Naturalistic Explanation Fits Better: A naturalistic account, explaining this as the result of selection pressures favoring traits that promoted in-group cooperation and defense against out-groups, fits the evidence better than a Theistic account that sees our moral cognition as divinely designed for a higher morality.
Challenge for Theism: No Theism can claim compatibility with CSR without addressing this moral challenge.
Nature of a Truly Compatible God-Concept: Meeting this challenge might require a concept of God that is dynamic and open to ongoing refinement, just like our cognitive processes. Scripture and theology would also need to be subject to this evolving understanding.
The Resulting "God" vs. Classical Theism: While it might be possible to develop such a cognitively compatible understanding of God, the more successful this effort is, the less this understanding will resemble the God of classical Theism.
