ex-apologist

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Review of Speaks' The Greatest Possible Being

Jonathan Kvanvig reviews the book for NDPR.

Theism, Substance Dualism, Personal Identity, Evil, and Quantum Mechanics

(Extremely rough draft.)

Ever since at least Ladyman and Ross's Every Thing Must Go (with David Wallace, Peter Lewis, David Albert, Tim Maudlin and many others in chorus) more and more philosophers have been coming to grips with the need for radical revisions in traditional analytic metaphysics in the light of quantum mechanics (QM) (cf. Jenann Ismael, Alyssa Ney, Peter Lewis, Kerry McKenzie, Jessica Wilson, Jonathan Schaffer, Ted Sider, Shamik Dasgupta, and many others).[1] However (aside from worries for the causal principle in cosmological arguments), it seems that the waves of the quantum revolution have yet to be felt in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. I noted one potential implication on another occasion. Here are a few more.

Prima facie, on any plausible interpretation of quantum mechanics (Bohmian, Everettian, and GRW), there are many worlds/universes. As Peter Lewis points out, non-Everrettian interpretations of quantum mechanics are just many-worlds accounts in denial[2]. This has serious implications for the metaphysics of personal identity and other issues related to philosophy of religion.

For example, take standard theistic accounts of substance dualism, and take the increasingly popular Everettian interpretation of QM (in fact, strictly speaking, it's not an interpretation: it just is QM). On that account, humans are constantly branching, hydra-like, into hugely many alternate universes, at virtually every moment of their lives. But if so, then prima facie, either (i) only one branch is you, or (ii) they all are you. On (i), God creates (directly, ex nihilo, or indirectly, through natural processes) new souls for each branch self at virtually every moment. On (ii), you have many selves. On either option, the sameness of soul account of personal identity is starting to look seriously unmotivated.

Furthermore, what are we to make of the afterlife? On (ii), all of your counterpart branch souls have an existence in an afterlife. Now combine that with the traditional doctrine of the soul being joined to a physical body at the final judgement. Prima facie, our world essentially involves QM and branching universes, in which case ,prima facie, so does any post-resurrection universe. Prima facie, all of the branching selves will be resurrected in different alternate universes, with counterpart Christs. On (i), it's hard to get an intelligible grasp of how all of my branching selves could be "me", each in their own resurrected bodies in alternate universes.

Furthermore, what are we to make of the person and work of Christ? For example, Jesus has many branch selves. Which one is the "real" Jesus? One? Some? All? Presumably, then, there are many Christs, and there will have to be many crucifixions. From this example, it becomes apparent that a host of other problems arise for the incarnation, atonement, trinity, and related doctrines.

Finally, there are infinitely many decohering branches of the universal wave function, such that infinitely many branches contain gratuitous evil.

In short, it looks as though quantum mechanics poses serious problems for both substance dualism and for theism. In fact, it's looking as though QM, all by itself, is incompatible with-- or, at the very least, highly surprising on -- traditional accounts of Christian theism and religious monotheism in general. Prima facie, then, QM provides at least strong abductive evidence against traditional monotheism.

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[1] The other main revolution in physics is relativistic quantum field theory (RQFT), according to which fields are more fundamental than particles: what we call 'particles' are really just field excitations. But that is another can of worms.

[2] Lewis, Peter J. Quantum Ontology: A Guide to the Metaphysics of Quantum Mechanics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

250 Arguments for Atheism

A popular view in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion is that while there are many arguments[1] for theism -- cosmological, ontological, and teleological arguments; moral arguments; arguments from consciousness; etc. (by Plantinga's lights, two dozen or so), there are only two arguments for atheism[2], viz., the problem of evil and (more recently) the problem of divine hiddenness. Indeed, some argue that the problem of divine hiddenness reduces to a version of the problem of evil, and thus that there is only one argument -- or at most, one category of argument -- for atheism.

This is a misconception. Here are over 240 arguments for atheism--i.e., 20 dozen (or so), spanning 29 categories:

I. Cosmological-Type Arguments

1. A modal cosmological argument for atheism

2. Epicurean cosmological arguments for naturalism
3. The argument from metaphysical infinitism/coherentism

4. Oppy's cosmological argument for naturalism
5. Smith’s big bang atheistic cosmological argument

6. Smith's argument from quantum cosmology

7. A Leibnizian-style cosmological argument against theism
8. Smith's Kalam cosmological argument for atheism

9. Park's Kalam cosmological argument for atheism

10. A grounding-based cosmological argument from one-category ontology
11. The Spinozistic argument from negative PSR to naturalism

12. The argument from PSR to monism

13. Dasgupta's tentative grounding-based argument for naturalism

14. Schaffer's grounding-based arguments for priority monism (see also)

15. Gunn's argument for the metaphysical necessity of matter's ultimate constituents

16. Steinhart's cosmological argument for atheistic Platonism

17. Leslie's cosmological argument for axiarchism (see also)

II. Ontological-Type Arguments

18. Goff's conceivability argument for atheism
19. A minimal modal ontological argument for naturalism
20. Quantum modal realist ontological argument for naturalism

21. The ontological argument for Spinozism
22. Maitzen’s ontological argument for atheism
23. Inductive arguments against Anselmianism
24. Another ontological disproof of theism

25. Vance's argument from de re modality to our world's necessary existence

26. Fritz, Lo, and Schmid's modal ontological argument for atheism

27. Steinhart's ontological argument for atheistic Platonism

III. Arguments from Order
28. Wilson's Everettian conditional argument from fine-tuning

29. Another argument from fine-tuning against theism (see also)
30. Atheistic teleological arguments (see also)

31. The argument from evolution (see also)

32. Steinhart's fine-tuning argument for atheistic Platonism

IV. Dysteleological Arguments
33. The argument from suboptimal design

34. The argument from the philosophy of nature

35. The problem of divine inefficiency

36. The argument from imperfection

37. The argument from scale

V. Arguments from Religion/Religious Experience
38. The argument from idolatry

39. The argument from indifference
40. The explanatory problem of religious diversity

41. The probabilistic argument from religious pluralism

42. The argument from the diversity of religious experiences

43. The problem of naturalistic explanations of religious belief

44. The argument from unreliably caused religious belief

45. The problem of natural nonbelief
46. The argument from anti-religious experience and properly basic atheistic belief

47. The argument from naturalistic explanations of the origin and existence of religions

48. The argument from naturalistic explanations of religious practices
49. The argument from the ineffectiveness of prayer (see also)
50. The argument from theistic demographics
51. The common core/diversity dilemma

52. The argument from mystical experience

53. Smith's argument from felt meanings of the world

VI. Arguments from Morality and Moral Psychology
54. The argument from the autonomy of normative ethics
55. The argument from the autonomy of metaethics
56. The argument from normative uncertainty

57. The argument from blameless moral ignorance
58. The argument from moral psychology
59. The argument from lack of character
60. The argument from lack of extensive empathy
61. The argument from ordinary morality
62. The argument from moral epistemology
63. The argument from meager moral fruits

64, 65. Humean arguments from moral sentimentalism and moral motivation

VII. Arguments from the Meaning of Life
66. Sartrean arguments for gravely diminished meaning in a theistic universe

67. The argument from the tedium of immortality

68. Wielenberg's argument for the meaningless of life in a theistic universe

69. Betenson's argument from futility in a theistic universe
70. The argument from excessive "anti-matter", or anti-meaning, in a theistic universe (see also)

71. The argument from diminished motivation in a theistic universe

72. The argument for the impossibility of life narrativity in a theistic universe

73. The argument from diminished virtue in a theistic universe (see also)

74. Sisyphean arguments against meaning in life in a theistic universe

75. The argument from the autonomy of the meaning of life (see also)

VIII. Arguments from Consciousness and Personhood
76. The argument from substance dualism to non-theism

77. The argument from the disunity of the self

78, 79. The problem(s) of dissociative identity disorder
80. The argument from the mind’s dependence on the brain
81. The argument from quantum mechanics against theistic accounts of personal identity, related issues

82. The structure and dynamics argument for Russellian monism

IX. Arguments from Agency

83. The argument from hard incompatibilism

X. Arguments from Reason

84. The argument from non-moral cognitive biases

85. The argument from motivated reasoning

86. Leon's abductive cumulative case argument from reason

XI. Arguments from Logic

87. The argument from logical pluralism/nihilism

88. The argument from counterexamples to basic "laws" of logic

XII. Arguments from Abstract Objects
89. The argument from the uncreatability/metaphysical independence of abstracta
90. The argument from abstracta as God’s metaphysical parts
91. The argument from God’s existence as a derivative being that supervenes upon platonic modal space
92. The Benacerraf argument against God’s knowledge of abstracta
93. The argument from one-category ontology

XIII. Arguments from the Nature of Causation

94. The argument from causal nihilism

95. The argument from differential support from theories of causation

96. Smith's argument from theories of causation to the impossibility of a divine cause

97. Fales' arguments for the impossibility of divine causation and intervention

98. The problem of creation ex nihilo

99. Humean argument from the nature of causation to atheism

XIV. Nomological Arguments

100. The argument from necessitarian accounts of laws of nature

XV. Arguments from General Ontology, Metaphysics, and Metametaphysics (that Don't Fit Neatly Into other Categories)

101. The argument from strong ontological nihilism
102. The argument from neo-Carnapian metametaphysics
103. The argument from modal normativism
104. The argument from necessitarianism

105. Arguments from categorical priority

106. The argument from absences

107. The argument from modal realism

XVI. Epistemological Arguments
108. The argument from theism to radical skepticism

109. The argument from mitigated modal skepticism
110. The argument from epistemic permissivism
111. The argument from pragmatic encroachment
112. The argument from peer religious disagreement

113, 114. The problem(s) of religious luck
115. The argument from Mandevillian intelligence
116. The argument from secondary qualities against the reliability of perception
117. The argument from Bayesian theories of perception (esp. prediction error minimization theories)
118. The argument from wave function realism against the reliability of perception
119. The problem of theistic evidentialist philosophers

XVII. Arguments from Aesthetics
120. The argument from ugliness
121. The argument from revulsion

XVIII. Arguments from Political Philosophy

122. Arguments from the incoherence of political (and divine) authority

123. Rawlsian arguments from distributive justice

124. Dworkinian arguments from distributive justice

125. Contractarian arguments against non-democratic rule

XIX. Normative Arguments (Apart from problems of evil)
126. The argument from the impropriety of worship
127. The argument from autonomy

128. The argument from freedom and moral responsibility

129. Cliffordian arguments from the impropriety of belief without sufficient evidence (and the failure of Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology)

XX. Arguments from Divine Hiddenness and Non-Belief
130. Deductive arguments from divine hiddenness
131. Probabilistic arguments from divine hiddenness

132. The problem of unjust hiddenness

133. Drange's argument from non-belief

XXI. Arguments from Incoherence Within/Among the Divine Attributes and Related Matters (Incomplete. These just scratch the surface. For more, see e.g. Oppy's Describing Gods)

134. Omnipotence (see also)
135. Omniscience (see also)

136. Foreknowledge

137. Beauty
138. Omnipresence

139. Divine freedom (See also)

140. Eternity

141. Aseity (self-existence)

142. Maximality

143. Perfection

144. Personhood (see also)

145. Creator and Sustainer
146. Divine consciousness
147. A new paradox of omnipotence
148. The aloneness argument

149. The incompatibility of omnipotence and omniscience

150. The incompatibility of omnipotence and essential moral perfection

151. The incompatibility of divine freedom and essential moral perfection

152. The incompatibility of omniscience and worthiness of worship

153. The incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and divine freedom

154. The incompatibility of omniscience and intentional agency

155. The incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom

156. The incompatibility of divine maximality and being a thinking being

157. The impossibility of God being a fitting object of gratitude

158. The problem of divine achievement

159. The problem of no best world

160. The argument from the existence of non-deities

161. The problem of divine moral standing to blame

162. The problem radical divine skepticism

163. The problem of divine constitutive luck

XXII. Arguments from Lower Comparative Prior Probability

164. Draper's argument from low priors

165. Leon's argument from low priors

XXIII. Arguments from Explanatory Inferiority

166. Dawes' defense of the argument from explanatory inferiority

167. The argument from contrastive explanation

XXIV. Arguments from Rival Supernaturalisms and/or Worldviews with Equal or Greater Explanatory Power and Related Matters

168. The problem of classical deism

169. The problem of aesthetic deism

170. The problem of demiurgism

171. The problem of necessitarian theism

172. The problem of euteological theism

173. The problem of pantheism

174. The problem of panentheism

175. The problem of agentive cosmopsychism

176. The problem of non-agentive teleological cosmopsychism

177. The problem of panpsychotheism

178. The problem of ananthropocentric purposivism

179. The problem of axiarchism

180. The problem of ultimism

181. The problem of ordinal polytheism

182. The problem of Spinozistic monism

183. The problem of non-theistic Platonism

184. Another argument from alternative supernaturalisms

185. Law's Evil-god challenge (see also)

186. The problem of the inclusive disjunction of rival supernaturalisms/worldviews

XXV. Arguments from the Success of Naturalistic Explanations

187. Dawes' defense of the argument from the success of naturalistic explanations

XXVI. Arguments from Private Evidence
188. Bartolome's argument from private evidence

XXVII. Arguments from Evil

189. The standard deductive argument from evil

190. Hume's argument from evil in Part X of the Dialogues

191. Hume's argument from evil in Part XI of the Dialogues

192. Mackie's logical problem of evil (and the failure of Plantinga's free will defense)

193, 194. Cohen's two new logical arguments from evil

195. Rowe's evidential arguments from evil

196. Draper's evidential argument from pain/pleasure

197. Tooley's argument from evil
198. The argument from horrors

199. The problem of animal suffering

200. The problem of infant suffering
201. The argument from flourishing/languishing
202. The Darwinian problem of evil

203. The argument from structural evil
204. Schellenberg's new logical problem of evil

205, 206. Oppy's new logical problems of evil and horrendous evil

207. Monaghan's new logical problem of evil
208. The argument from religious evil
209. The argument from divine evil
210. The argument from hell
211. The argument from the requirement of divine interference (see also)

212. The argument from eternally separated lovers
213. The argument from inhospitable environment
214. The argument from teleological evil

215. The argument from evil natural laws
216. The argument from natural inequalities
217. The argument from social evil
218. The argument from insect suffering
219. The argument from tragic moral dilemmas
220. Sterba's new deductive argument from evil
221. The argument from unfairness
222. The problem of the death of most humans before the age of accountability
223. The argument from the harm of coming into existence
224. The argument from physiological horrors
225. The argument from heaven

226. The argument from dual process theory

227. The common sense problem of evil

228. The perspectival problem of evil

229. Bruce Russell's argument from evil

230. The argument from human cognitive moral architecture

231. The Free Will Offense

232. Morriston's Humean evidential argument from evil (see also)

233. Morriston's problem of evil divine commands (e.g., genocide)

234. The modal problem of evil

235. The Everettian problem of evil

236. The problem of epistemic evil

237. The higher order problem of evil

238. The normatively relativised logical problem of evil

239. Frances' problem of absurd evil

240. Lemos' Kantian argument from natural evil

241, 242. Rawlsian arguments from evil

(See also these collections on problems of evil)

XXVIII. Pragmatic/Prudential Arguments

243. Jamesian pragmatic arguments for atheism (see also)

244. Pascalian prudential arguments for atheism (see also)

245. Kahane's prudential arguments for atheism

XXIX. Cumulative case/Combinatorial Arguments
246. Oppy’s abductive cumulative case argument for naturalism

247. Leon’s abductive cumulative case argument for liberal naturalism
248. Draper’s Bayesian cumulative case argument against theism

249. Schellenberg's combinatorial argument for atheism

250. Various cumulative IBE arguments from large conjunctive disjuncts of 1-242.

Some things worthy of note. First, there are very, very many more arguments for atheism than commonly supposed. Indeed, if Plantinga is to be believed that there are just two dozen (or so) arguments for theism, then atheistic arguments outnumber theistic arguments by an order of magnitude. Second, while categorization is inevitably somewhat arbitrary, there are clearly very many more types of atheistic arguments than commonly supposed -- on my reckoning, 27 other types of atheistic argument besides the problem of evil. Third, the list doesn't include arguments specifically against orthodox Christianity. If it did, the list would be considerably longer. Fourth, roughly 75-80% of atheistic arguments have nothing to do with the problem of evil -- problems of evil are in the minority.

Fifth, the evidence against theism appears to be systemic -- it provides non-trivial grounds for thinking the data from virtually every major aspect of reality (e.g.: the origin, existence, and structure of the universe; consciousness; agency; morality and moral psychology; reason; logic; abstract objects; the nature of causation; the laws of nature; epistemology; religions, religious practices, and religious experience; aesthetics; political philosophy; the meaning of life; general ontology, metaphysics, and meta-metaphysics; and yes, suffering and hiddenness, too) points away from theism and towards some form of naturalism. One can cull very large subsets of compatible arguments from the list above to generate a variety of large abductive cumulative case arguments. Prima facie, there is very strong promise that when this is done, naturalism will embody the theoretical virtues (e.g., simplicity, scope, conservatism, etc.) better than orthodox theism. I would argue that this remains so even after throwing in all the viable data points standardly appealed to in the case for theism, in which case the relevant data renders a form of naturalism more probable than orthodox theism. (A similar point applies to taking all these data points to run a comprehensive Bayesian argument for naturalism.)

Sixth, the previous points constitute non-trivial grounds for thinking the case for atheism doesn't essentially depend on the success of the problem of evil and hiddenness, in which case theists have much more work to do besides addressing those arguments.

Finally, most people who care about arguments for and against theism are adherents of some form of orthodox religious monotheism or other. Among such groups, it's typically thought that the case for their faith must be persuasive, such that no (or almost no) mature, rational, properly functioning human being who appraised the relevant evidence could non-culpably fail to believe after assessing it (on the grounds that (i) God holds people morally responsible for their belief, and (ii) God would be less than perfectly good if he held people morally responsible for their belief if the evidence were less than persuasive). Thus, consider some rational, mature, properly functioning adult agnostic, Joe, who has strongly grasped, internalized, and carefully appraised the above arguments, as well as all the arguments for theism on the other side of the ledger. Suppose further that after long and careful reflection, Joe finds the grounds for atheism to be either stronger than those for theism, or at least, counterbalanced with them. Finally, suppose that Joe thereby either disbelieves or suspends judgement about theism. According to the group of theists specified just above, there can be no one like Joe: The evidence for orthodox monotheism is so good that for any person S, if S is a rational, mature, properly functioning agent, and (after careful reflection and deliberation) S fails to find the evidence to support theism over atheism, or if S merely finds the evidence to be counterbalanced -- or indeed, if S finds themself unable to tell, with any confidence, which way the evidence points -- then S is morally culpable for failing to believe in the relevant version of orthodox monotheism. In light of the case for atheism expressed in the arguments listed above, this looks to be implausible, if not ridiculous.

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Notes:

[1] Here and henceforth, I use the notion of an argument broadly, so as to include deductive, inductive, and abductive arguments. I also follow Richard Swinburne in recognizing the distinction between what he calls C-inductive arguments (which are arguments that raise the probabilities of their conclusions at least to some degree, although not necessarily rendering their conclusions more probable than not) and P-inductive arguments (which are arguments that raise the probabilities of their conclusions above 1/2), and include both C-inductive and P-inductive arguments to count as arguments for theism and for atheism.

[2] Here and henceforth, I follow Jeanine Diller and Paul Draper in distinguishing between global atheism (the denial of all gods) and local atheism (denial of a specific god or type of god). I'm taking the arguments in the list below to be arguments for local atheism with respect to the god of orthodox monotheism (although many arguments on the list provide at least some grounds for rejecting at least some other types of gods).