250 Arguments for Atheism

A popular view in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion is that while there are many arguments[1] for theism -- cosmological, ontological, and teleological arguments; moral arguments; arguments from consciousness; etc. (by Plantinga's lights, two dozen or so), there are only two arguments for atheism[2], viz., the problem of evil and (more recently) the problem of divine hiddenness. Indeed, some argue that the problem of divine hiddenness reduces to a version of the problem of evil, and thus that there is only one argument -- or at most, one category of argument -- for atheism.

This is a misconception. Here are over 240 arguments for atheism--i.e., 20 dozen (or so), spanning 29 categories:

I. Cosmological-Type Arguments
1. A modal cosmological argument for atheism
2. Epicurean cosmological arguments for naturalism 
3. The argument from metaphysical infinitism/coherentism

II. Ontological-Type Arguments
18. Goff's conceivability argument for atheism
19. A minimal modal ontological argument for naturalism
20. Quantum modal realist ontological argument for naturalism

IV. Dysteleological Arguments
33. The argument from suboptimal design

V. Arguments from Religion/Religious Experience
38. The argument from idolatry

VIII. Arguments from Consciousness and Personhood
76. The argument from substance dualism to non-theism

X. Arguments from Reason

XI. Arguments from Logic


XIII. Arguments from the Nature of Causation
XIV. Nomological Arguments

XV. Arguments from General Ontology, Metaphysics, and Metametaphysics (that Don't Fit Neatly Into other Categories)

XVI. Epistemological Arguments
108. The argument from theism to radical skepticism
113, 114. The problem(s) of religious luck
115. The argument from Mandevillian intelligence
116. The argument from secondary qualities against the reliability of perception
117. The argument from Bayesian theories of perception (esp. prediction error minimization theories)
118. The argument from wave function realism against the reliability of perception
119. The problem of theistic evidentialist philosophers

XVII. Arguments from Aesthetics
120. The argument from ugliness
121. The argument from revulsion

XVIII. Arguments from Political Philosophy
124. Rawlsian arguments argument from distributive justice
125. Dworkinian arguments from distributive justice
126. Contractarian arguments against non-democratic rule

XIX. Normative Arguments (Apart from problems of evil)
127. The argument from the impropriety of worship
128. The argument from autonomy 

XX. Arguments from Divine Hiddenness and Non-Belief
131. Deductive arguments from divine hiddenness
132. Probabilistic arguments from divine hiddenness
134. Drange's argument from non-belief

XXI. Arguments from Incoherence Within/Among the Divine Attributes and Related Matters (Incomplete. These just scratch the surface. For more, see e.g. Oppy's Describing Gods)
135. Omnipotence (see also)
136. Omniscience (see also)
138. Beauty
139. Omnipresence
141. Eternity

XXII. Arguments from Lower Comparative Prior Probability

XXIII. Arguments from Explanatory Inferiority 

XXIV. Arguments from Rival Supernaturalisms and/or Worldviews with Equal or Greater Explanatory Power and Related Matters
169. The problem of classical deism
187. The problem of the inclusive disjunction of rival supernaturalisms/worldviews

XXV. Arguments from the Success of Naturalistic Explanations

XXVI. Arguments from Private Evidence
189. Bartolome's argument from private evidence

XXVII. Arguments from Evil 
(See also these collections on problems of evil) 

XXVIII. Pragmatic/Prudential Arguments
XXIX. Cumulative case/Combinatorial Arguments
247. Oppy’s abductive cumulative case argument for naturalism
251. Various cumulative IBE arguments from large conjunctive disjuncts of 1-243.

Some things worthy of note. First, there are very, very many more arguments for atheism than commonly supposed. Indeed, if Plantinga is to be believed that there are just two dozen (or so) arguments for theism, then atheistic arguments outnumber theistic arguments by an order of magnitude. Second, while categorization is inevitably somewhat arbitrary, there are clearly very many more types of atheistic arguments than commonly supposed -- on my reckoning, 27 other types of atheistic argument besides the problem of evil. Third, the list doesn't include arguments specifically against orthodox Christianity. If it did, the list would be considerably longer. Fourth, roughly 75-80% of atheistic arguments have nothing to do with the problem of evil -- problems of evil are in the minority. 

Fifth, the evidence against theism appears to be systemic -- it provides non-trivial grounds for thinking the data from virtually every major aspect of reality (e.g.: the origin, existence, and structure of the universe; consciousness; agency; morality and moral psychology; reason; logic; abstract objects; the nature of causation; the laws of nature; epistemology; religions, religious practices, and religious experience; aesthetics; political philosophy; the meaning of life; general ontology, metaphysics, and meta-metaphysics; and yes, suffering and hiddenness, too) points away from theism and towards some form of naturalism. One can cull very large subsets of compatible arguments from the list above to generate a variety of large abductive cumulative case arguments. Prima facie, there is very strong promise that when this is done, naturalism will embody the theoretical virtues (e.g., simplicity, scope, conservatism, etc.) better than orthodox theism. I would argue that this remains so even after throwing in all the viable data points standardly appealed to in the case for theism, in which case the relevant data renders a form of naturalism more probable than orthodox theism.  (A similar point applies to taking all these data points to run a comprehensive Bayesian argument for naturalism.)

Sixth, the previous points constitute non-trivial grounds for thinking the case for atheism doesn't essentially depend on the success of the problem of evil and hiddenness, in which case theists have much more work to do besides addressing those arguments. 

Finally, most people who care about arguments for and against theism are adherents of some form of orthodox religious monotheism or other. Among such groups, it's typically thought that the case for their faith must be persuasive, such that no (or almost no) mature, rational, properly functioning human being who appraised the relevant evidence could non-culpably fail to believe after assessing it (on the grounds that (i) God holds people morally responsible for their belief, and (ii) God would be less than perfectly good if he held people morally responsible for their belief if the evidence were less than persuasive). Thus, consider some rational, mature, properly functioning adult agnostic, Joe, who has strongly grasped, internalized, and carefully appraised the above arguments, as well as all the arguments for theism on the other side of the ledger. Suppose further that after long and careful reflection, Joe finds the grounds for atheism to be either stronger than those for theism, or at least, counterbalanced with them. Finally, suppose that Joe thereby either disbelieves or suspends judgement about theism. According to the group of theists specified just above, there can be no one like Joe: The evidence for orthodox monotheism is so good that for any person S, if S is a rational, mature, properly functioning agent, and (after careful reflection and deliberation) S fails to find the evidence to support theism over atheism, or if S merely finds the evidence to be counterbalanced -- or indeed, if S finds themself unable to tell, with any confidence, which way the evidence points -- then S is morally culpable for failing to believe in the relevant version of orthodox monotheism. In light of the case for atheism expressed in the arguments listed above, this looks to be implausible, if not ridiculous. 

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Notes:
[1] Here and henceforth, I use the notion of an argument broadly, so as to include deductive, inductive, and abductive arguments. I also follow Richard Swinburne in recognizing the distinction between what he calls C-inductive arguments (which are arguments that raise the probabilities of their conclusions at least to some degree, although not necessarily rendering their conclusions more probable than not) and P-inductive arguments (which are arguments that raise the probabilities of their conclusions above 1/2), and include both C-inductive and P-inductive arguments to count as arguments for theism and for atheism.

[2] Here and henceforth, I follow Jeanine Diller and Paul Draper in distinguishing between global atheism (the denial of all gods) and local atheism (denial of a specific god or type of god). I'm taking the arguments in the list below to be arguments for local atheism with respect to the god of orthodox monotheism (although many arguments on the list provide at least some grounds for rejecting at least some other types of gods).
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Oppy's Argument from Freedom and Responsibility for the Moral Repugnance of Theism

 Here's an intriguing little argument sketched by Graham Oppy:

The only kind of freedom that it is possible to have is compatibilist freedom. But it is impossible to have compatibilist freedom if there is a causally upstream agent who selects one’s beliefs and desires. So it is impossible for you to be free if you are one of God’s creatures. But freedom is a highly significant moral good. So God’s non-existence is morally desirable: God’s non- existence is necessary for our freedom and the goods that our freedom makes possible—e.g., moral responsibility.

Oppy, "Arguments for Atheism", in Oppy Graham (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Atheism (OUP, 2013), p. 59.

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Elbert's New Atheistic Argument from Blameless Moral Ignorance

Elbert, F., (2022) “God and the Problem of Blameless Moral Ignorance”, Ergo 8: 32. doi: https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2233.

Here's the abstract:

A morally perfect God necessarily desires that all rational agents behave morally. An omnipotent and omniscient God has the power and knowledge to ensure that all rational agents have sufficient moral knowledge to do what morality requires. So, if God exists, there are no rational moral agents who lack sufficient moral knowledge to act morally. However, there has been a wide range of moral agents who, without blame, have lacked the moral knowledge to behave morally. Therefore, God does not exist. The preceding argument from non-blameable moral ignorance of our fundamental moral obligations is resistant to some of the standard theistic responses to the problem of evil and divine hiddenness. Moreover, some of the standard theistic responses to the traditional arguments for God’s non-existence lend support to the argument from blameless moral ignorance.

Happy reading!

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Standard Responses to the Naturalistic Fallacy Argument (Moore) and the Is/Ought Gap Argument (Hume)

Rough Draft: First Pass.

Standard responses to the naturalistic fallacy argument in the literature:

1. Some analytic truths aren’t obvious, and truths about the nature of moral normativity are likely among such truths (cf. many mathematical truths).

2. Related to (2): Falsely assumes there are no interesting analyses, when in fact there are many (e.g., knowledge as JTB or truth-tracking theories; dispositional analyses of color, etc.). (Smith)

3. Frankena’s objection: the open question argument begs the question against analytical moral naturalism. 

4. The goodness-fixing kinds response (Geach, Thomson): Moore's argument presupposes that there is such a property as goodness full-stop, but this is false; there is only goodness relative to a kind (e.g., a good knife, a good toaster, good person, etc.), and the standards of goodness are relative to the kind of thing something is. Whether a thing is good depends upon whether it performs the function of its kind well (as with functional kinds) or otherwise meets its kind's standards of correctness. 

5. The argument doesn’t apply to a posteriori moral naturalism.

6. The argument's conclusion is unproblematic for non-theistic non-naturalist moral realism.

Standard responses to the is/ought gap argument in the literature:

1. Thick ethical concepts (e.g., 'cruel', 'generous', 'selfish', etc.) have inextricable components that straddle the normative/descriptive divide (cf. Foot, Williams et al.), in which case there is no sharp is/ought divide. But since Hume’s is/ought gap argument requires a sharp is/ought divide, his argument fails to show that moral normativity is problematic.

2. You can derive an ought from an is (Prior, Searle, Maitzen et al.). Here’s Maitzen’s example from his paper, “Closing the Is/Ought Gap”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy (1998): 

(Bl) Some ethical sentences, standardly construed, are true. 

(B2) Either no ethical sentence, standardly construed, is true, or torturing babies just for fun is morally wrong. 

Therefore: 

(B3) Torturing babies just for fun is morally wrong. 

3. Neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, non-theistic natural law theory, and non-theistic proper functionalist moral realism (Aristotle, Foot, Hursthouse,  Nussbaum, Thomson, Lott et al.): You can get an ought from an is via natural biological functions, and you can get natural biological functions without an intelligent designer.

4. Related to (3): The value-first buck-passing response (Foot, Hursthouse Lott et al.): reduce moral normativity to goodness, and analyze goodness in terms of flourishing or proper function or health or… Since flourishing (or proper function or health or…) is a natural property, normativity reduces to the natural.

5. The reasons-first buck-passing response (Scanlon, Schroeder et al.): Moral normativity is reducible to the normativity of reasons. Humean vs. Kantian accounts. Humean accounts (see, esp. Schroeder) say that S has a reason to phi just in case phi satisfies one of S’s desires. Since desire-satisfaction is a natural property, the normative reduces to the natural. (Relatedly: reduce moral oughts to practical or instrumental oughts: Railton, Williams. See 7 below)

6. (Non-constructivist) constitutivism  (Thomson, Smith): You get moral normativity from descriptive facts through goodness-fixing kinds.

7. Moral oughts reduce to instrumental/practical oughts, and instrumental oughts are naturalistically unproblematic (Williams, Railton et al.). Example: Morality is reducible to instrumental rationality from the social point of view (Railton). Relatedly: Reforming-definitions of morality (Brandt, Foot, Railton et al.): Morality is usually, but not always or necessarily, action-guiding. The contrary view was part of our intuitive, public conception of morality, but it’s a defective part. We should therefore reform our conception of morality accordingly to make it reflect the moral facts more accurately. Reject morality as a system of categorical imperatives; take morality as a system of hypothetical imperatives. 

8. Constructivism, whether Kantian (Rawls, Korsgaard et al.) or Humean (Street et al.). Moral norms are mind-dependent, yet necessarily constructed, by persons.

9. Analytical functionalism/network analyses (Jackson, Pettit): Normative moral properties strongly supervene on natural properties -- there are no two possible scenarios with identical descriptive properties that differ in their normative properties. This is a strong reason to think normative moral properties are identical to descriptive properties. One can assemble our normative moral platitudes, functionalize them and represent them via a purely descriptive Ramsey sentence, and then identify our normative moral properties with the descriptive properties upon which they strongly supervene, thereby reducing the normative to the descriptive (cf. D. Lewis).

10.  A posteriori moral naturalism/Cornell Realism (Boyd, Brink, Sturgeon et al.): Kripke and Putnam showed that there are a posteriori necessities, since there can be two or more concepts for the same property, and (the narrow content of) neither concept entails the other. The normative facts either strongly supervene upon or are identical to certain natural facts, but these are necessities that are only knowable a posteriori. Moral truths strongly supervene upon natural truths. So by IBE, the best explanation is that those natural truths ground or constitute or are identical to the moral truths.

11. Response-dependence/projectivist accounts (e.g., Hume, Wright et al.): Moral properties are like secondary qualities. They are mind-dependent, yet generated by all normal human minds under normal conditions.

12. Non-theistic moral non-naturalism (e.g., Moore, Ross, Wielenberg, Huemer): Oughts exist at the metaphysical ground floor, and so there is no need to derive an ought from an is.[1]

13. Expressivism (Gibbard et al.): There are no moral norms. However, facts about a given agent's practical/instrumental reasoning/planning play the role of supposed moral norms, and statements about morality can be replaced with statements about our plans/planning.

14. Fictionalism, in either its hermeneutical or revolutionary forms (Kalderon, Nolan, Restall & West, Joyce et al.): Moral norms aren't real, but we have outweighing practical reasons to act as if they are. These fictions suffice to play the role of objective moral norms.


For further reading: 

Standard primers and related points of entry into the relevant metaethics literature include:

Kirchin, Simon. Metaethics. Palgrave MacMillan, 2012.

McPherson, Tristan and Plunkett, David. The Routledge handbook of metaethics. Routledge, 2018.

Miller, Alexander. Contemporary metaethics: An introduction, 2nd, edition. Polity, 2013.

Van Roojen, Mark. Metaethics: A contemporary introduction. Routledge, 2015.

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Notes

[1] It’s perhaps natural to think this approach is broadly Platonist, but Aristotelian accounts can take normativity to be at the ground floor as well, and to see objects generally as teleologically and thus normatively structured.

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Hassoun's Excellent New Paper on the Problem of Falling from Grace

Hassoun, Nicole. "Falling from Grace and the Problem of Free Will", European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14:4 (2022).

Abstract: On the traditional Christian doctrine: 1. People have free will (in Heaven  as  on  Earth).  2.  Those  with  free  will  can  go  to  Hell.  3.  Heaven  is  eternal.  Many  Christians  also  hold:  4.  God  is  all  powerful,  knowing  and  good  and  5.  Free  will  can  justify  eternal  suffering,  evil,  or  hell.  The  paper  argues  that  those  who  accept  a  version  of  Christianity  that  endorses  1–5  face  a  dilemma:  Either  deny  that  free  will  can  justify  suffering,  evil,  or  hell  or  accept  that  we  can  fail  in  heaven  and  so  go  to  hell.  It  suggests  that  compassionate  Christians  may  do  best  to  i)  give  up  on  the  idea  that  free  will is valuable enough to justify significant suffering. This may require: ii) accepting that something has gone woefully wrong on Earth and iii) giving up the idea that people can suffer significantly in Hell, but allows Christians to maintain that iv) Heaven is eternal.

Happy reading! 

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Clatterbuck's Fantastic New Paper on Darwin's Argument Against Special Creationism...

 ..is now out in The Philosopher's Imprint. Here's the abstract:
In the Origin, Darwin forwards two incompatible lines of attack on special creationism. First, he argues that imperfect or functionless traits are evidence against design. Second, he argues that since special creationism can be made compatible with any observation, it is unscientific and explanatorily vacuous. In later works, Darwin shifts to an argument that he finds much more persuasive and which would undermine theistic evolutionism as well. He argues that variation is random with respect to selection and that this demonstrates that there is no design in the biological world. I examine why Darwin found the argument from independence of variation and selection more compelling than the argument from imperfection. I argue that Darwin utilized general principles of causal inference, akin to those used in modern causal modeling, to rule out any unified cause behind the evolutionary process. 
Essential reading.

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Existential Inertia and Classical Theistic Proofs

Regular readers of this blog will know that Schmid and Linford's terrific book, Existential Inertia and Classical Theistic Proofs is now out with Springer. Here's the blurb:

This book critically assesses arguments for the existence of the God of classical theism, develops an innovative account of objects’ persistence, and defends new arguments against classical theism. The authors engage the following classical theistic proofs: Aquinas’s First Way, Aquinas’s De Ente argument, and Feser’s Aristotelian, Neo-Platonic, Augustinian, Thomistic, and Rationalist proofs.  The authors also provide the first systematic treatment of the ‘existential inertia thesis’.  By connecting the thesis to relativity theory and recent developments in the philosophy of physics, and by developing a variety of novel existential-inertia-friendly explanations of persistence, they mount a formidable new case against classical theistic proofs. Finally, they defend new arguments against classical theism based on abstract objects and changing divine knowledge. The text appeals to students, researchers, and others interested in classical theistic proofs, the existence and nature of God, and the ultimate explanations of persistence, change, and contingency.

Happy reading!

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Alimi's New Paper on the Problem of Divine Domination

Alimi, Toni. Divine domination . Religious Studies (2025), 1–19. doi:10.1017/S0034412525100917 Abstract: This article develops the problem ...